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Preface 
Unprecedented urbanization rates in most developing countries are changing the face of 
poverty: increasingly, poverty is moving into cities. Millions of jobseekers, men and 
women, end up in the urban informal economy, earning just enough to survive, without 
any form of social security for neither themselves nor their families. Most cities cannot 
cope with this influx, their infrastructures are underdeveloped and in a bad state of 
maintenance, and services are not functioning or do not reach the poorest 
neighbourhoods. In addition to suffering low incomes, the urban poor are thus exposed 
to health hazards due to bad drainage, waste accumulation, lack of sanitary facilities 
and so on. Yet, cities are also places of opportunity. Improvements in infrastructures, 
including shelter, and services can directly and indirectly improve the lives of large 
numbers of people. But such improvements can hardly be sustainable if not supported 
by the simultaneous promotion of decent employment opportunities. Therefore, 
employment generation should be a top priority for urban planners, managers and 
decision-makers, and deliberate policies are necessary to promote employment for the 
urban poor. 
 
The material in this report is intended as a contribution by the International Labour 
Organisation to the work of Task Force 8 on employment creation in slum upgrading.  
The Task Force was created by the UN Secretary General to support the attainment of 
the MDG’s.   
 
The geographic focus of the report is South Africa, and it includes specific 
recommendations on opportunities for further employment generation in slum-
upgrading programmes in South Africa. The material from the report was circulated to 
South African stakeholders for comment, and was also presented to a joint workshop 
organised by the EPWP Unit of the South African Department of Public Works and the 
regional representatives of the ILO.  
iv 
Acknowledgements 
Several policy-makers and practitioners in the fields of urban development and 
employment creation contributed to this report.  The ILO and the authors acknowledge 
and record their appreciation for the inputs of those people interviewed for the case 
studies, and for the inputs of other stakeholders who were consulted.   
 
The authors acknowledge the ILO, and in particular Tomas Stenstrom and Steven 
Miller, for making the funds available for the research and for insightful comments on 
the text.   
 
Images on cover page: courtesy Tommy Ferreira, eThekwini Municipality.  
v 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
ANC     African  National  Congress 
CBOs   Community  Based  Organisations 
CMDA    Cato Manor Development Agency 
CMDP    Cato  Manor  Development  Programme 
DOH     Department  of  Housing 
CBPWP   Community Based Public Works Programme 
EPWP    Extended  Public  Works  Programme 
ESF       Employment  Strategy  Framework 
EU     European  Union 
GEAR     Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Strategy) 
LED    Local  Economic  Development 
MDGs    Millennium  Development  Goals 
MIG    Municipal  Infrastructure  Grant 
N/A      Not  applicable 
NGOs   Non  Government  Organisations 
PHP    People’s  Housing  Process 
PHPT      Peoples Housing Partnership Trust  
RDP       Reconstruction and Development Programme 
SME       Small  and  Micro  Enterprises 
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme 
  
vi 
Executive Summary 
Introduction 
The International Labour Office (ILO)’s terms of reference for this report were to: 
 
  “Examine the employment aspects of past, present and future slum upgrading 
programs in South Africa, focusing on labour-intensive technologies, private sector 
involvement, community participation as well as skills development.”  
 
[ILO, 2005] 
 
Since the mid-1990’s, housing has been a major focus of the democratic South African 
government.  Housing was a key element of the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP, Government of South Africa, 1994) and has remained a centre-piece of 
the government’s development programme.  During the past decade significant process 
has been made in the delivery of basic services, housing, and stabilising the economy.  
However, it is only really in the past few years that the governments’ intentions have 
grown stronger to explicitly use development programmes as a strategy to reduce the 
current unemployment levels of over 30%. 
 
The report traces the evolution over the past decade of employment-related policies in 
slum upgrading.  This is supplemented by two case studies of housing and urban 
upgrades in quite different contexts.  The findings of the policy overview and the case 
studies inform some recommendations on how employment could be improved through 
South Africa’s shelter-related endeavours. 
 
Methodology and limitations of the report 
The main source of material for the study was existing information in the public 
domain.  This included project reports and external project assessments, policy 
statements and policy reviews, and in some cases academic work.  The material was 
supplemented by primary research, mainly through interviews with selected 
commentators.  
 
The South African policy environment 
South Africa has large developmental backlogs that resulted from apartheid policies, 
and which have persisted in the post-apartheid era.   
 
The collapse of apartheid’s controls on the movement of black people in the late 1980s 
led to an increase in urbanisation.  Urban centres had provided little in the way of 
services to already urbanised black communities, and were ill-equipped to handle the 
influx.  The urbanisation of the 1980s was evidenced by the growth of large-scale 
informal settlements, overcrowding of existing township housing units and hostels, and 
the pervasive construction of back-yard shacks.   
 
Today close to half of South Africa’s 44 million people live in urban centres.  A third 
of those in the major urban centres live in informal settlements [South African Cities 
Network, 2004].  Despite considerable government efforts to transform urban 
environments and deal with developmental challenges such as education and health, 
many people continue to live in poverty and suffer a lack of access to basic services.   
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This has been aggravated by unemployment at 50% or more within many of the largest 
urban informal settlements.  
 
Development policies in South Africa have been overlaid by the policy of incremental 
decentralisation to local government of decision-making powers over social and 
economic development [1996 National Constitution, South African Government].  The 
rationale for the decentralisation is that municipalities face the greatest challenge in 
meeting human needs and addressing past backlogs and spatial distortions.  In theory, 
local government is the institutional hinge on which the successful implementation of 
urban development policies depend.  The implementation of the decentralisation policy 
requires a complex set of inter-governmental relations. 
 
After the 1994 elections, the democratic government launched the RDP in response to 
the country’s legacy of apartheid, and to contribute towards the building of a 
democratic, non-racial and non-sexist country.  The RDP’s five pillars were: 
  Meeting basic needs; 
  Developing our human resources; 
  Building the economy; 
  Democratising the state and society; and 
  Implementing the RDP 
 
[ANC, 1994]. 
 
In June 1996, the Minister of Finance published the country’s macro-economic 
strategy, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR, Government of 
South Africa, 1996).  GEAR argued for market-driven economic expansion and growth.  
GEAR aimed to strengthen economic growth, to broaden employment, and to 
redistribute economic opportunities.  GEAR focussed strongly on stabilisation 
(especially the curtailment of expenditure to reduce government deficit) and on the 
rapid liberalisation of trade and industrial policy.  In the first five years of GEAR, these 
structural adjustments achieved their aims, but also led to considerable formal 
employment losses in the private and public spheres, and reduced the resources 
available to respond effectively to rising social needs. More recently, the long-term 
social benefits of GEAR have begun to be realised, as evidenced by greater budget 
allocations to social development, lower inflation, and a stabilisation of unemployment 
levels.  
 
The Department of Provincial and Local Government produced Urban and Rural 
Development Frameworks in 1996 in order to provide policy guidelines for the 
development of urban and rural areas, especially around infrastructure, housing, and 
local economic development.  These frameworks focused on integration, poverty 
alleviation, and the redress of past imbalances (du Plessis & Napier, 2001).  Similar 
intentions had been expressed in the Housing White Paper (1994), which set out 
government’s broad housing policy and strategy.  The impact of South Africa’s post-
apartheid housing and settlement policies have been profound.  Since the launch of the 
White Paper on Housing (1994) until March 2005 more than 1.8 million houses were 
provided to more than seven million people.  
[Department of Housing, 2005].   
 
Most recently the Government introduced the Comprehensive Housing Plan for the 
Development of Integrated Sustainable Human Settlements - popularly referred to as  
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Breaking New Ground (BNG).  BNG provides for comprehensive oversight by 
government in promoting the residential property market.  BNG envisages the 
development of medium-density and rental housing; stronger partnerships with the 
private sector, and the provision of social infrastructure and amenities.  BNG aims at 
changing spatial settlement patterns, so as to build multicultural communities in a non-
racial society. 
 
In recent shifts in economic policy, government has placed much more explicit 
attention on employment creation.  This initially took the form of a variety of measures 
such as the Community-Based Public Works Programme, the Working for Water 
Programme and others.  These and many similar initiatives have now been brought 
together under the banner of the Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP).  The 
EPWP seeks to generate short term employment and skills upgrading for millions of 
unemployed South Africans.  In parallel, government has proposed a more 
expansionary public programme of investment in infrastructure and services, and this is 
likely to generate employment as projects are implemented. 
 
Case studies 
The case studies show that housing projects can positively influence often missed 
employment processes, if part of a conscious attempt to do so..  The first case, Cato 
Manor in Durban, was the subject of a major urban re-development project co-funded 
by the government and the European Union.  The second case is that of the People’s 
Housing Process in a small-scale housing project in Vosloorus, Ekurhuleni (near 
Johannesburg).  The two case studies differed from one another in a number of 
respects.  The scale of Cato Manor project was that of a major national project managed 
by a specialist agency, whilst the Vosloorus project is a relatively small scale 
intervention (although quite large in the context of Peoples’ Housing Process projects) 
managed through the channels of a local municipality via an appointed facilitator.  The 
Cato Manor project was conceptualised as an integrated urban development project.  
The Vosloorus project on the other hand was a project focused on housing provision 
where local stakeholders sought ways to achieve more integrated results.  
 
The tables below summarises skills development and employment creation in the 
projects. 
 
In Cato Manor: 
 
No. local residents trained 
No. local residents who were 
given temporary employment  Activity 
No. 
% of resident 
pop.  No. 
% of resident 
pop. 
LED  2973  3.2%  3644  3.9% 
Housing  2610  2.8%  2610  2.8% 
Infrastructure  0  0.0%  1136  1.2% 
Social Facilities  1369  1.5%  1369  1.5% 
Total  6952  7.5%  8759  9.4% 
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In Vosloorus: 
 
No. local residents trained 
No. local residents who were 
given temporary employment  Activity 
No. 
% of resident 
pop.  No. 
% of resident 
pop. 
LED  20  0.3%  20  0.3% 
Housing  530  8.7%  220  3.6% 
Infrastructure  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
Social Facilities  27  0.4%  27  0.4% 
Total  577  9.5%  267  4.4% 
 
 
The key employment-related conclusions from the two cases are: 
Summary of points of comparison: 
Issue  Cato Manor  Vosloorus 
Beneficiary 
participation  Moderate High 
Local labour 
sourcing 
High – but some  resistance to 
women 
High – but short-lived resistance 
to women 
Skills High  High 
Links to LED  High 
Low in the past, but there are 
indications that an LED program 
is slowly evolving 
Sourcing of 
materials  Non-local Non-local 
Construction 
approach 
Appropriate technology & contractor 
support system used 
Appropriate technology & 
contractor support system used 
 
 
Despite their very different scale and contexts, the cases have a number of striking 
similarities.  These include: 
  Some attempts, more explicit in the Cato Manor case, to adopt a holistic vision of 
community development. Improvements in the built, economic, social and 
institutional environments were regarded and managed as integral to slum 
upgrading and greenfields housing processes but in practise this was not always 
sustained; 
  The use of an emerging contractor development program (as opposed to a simpler 
labour-only basis), and the longer-term benefits of this approach; 
  The critical roles performed by the development agencies in guiding and sustaining 
the developments; 
  Relatively well-capacitated municipalities supporting the projects. 
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Recommendations – Opportunities for employment creation 
The graphic below lists factors which, impact on employment creation in housing and 
related processes in various ways.  
 
Some key factors affecting employment in slum upgrading/housing projects
Beneficiary 
skills and 
participation
PROJECT 
INTERFACE
Project 
management
Governance 
of project
Contractor and materials 
supplier mandates / 
capacity
LOCAL 
ENVIRONMENT Local 
authority 
policy
Local 
authority 
delivery 
capacity 
(infrastructure 
and 
administrative 
processes)
Civil 
society 
capabilities
Capabilities of 
support 
institutions / 
organisations
Competitiveness / 
quality of goods and 
services providers
Local business 
& labour market 
environment
NATIONAL 
CONTEXT
State of national 
economy
Policy 
signals in 
documents 
and by 
leaders
Regulations
Leadership 
prioritisation
Technical 
aspects of 
policy
Process 
management
Mobilisation and 
participation of 
stakeholders
Approaches 
to private 
and public 
financing
 
 
Beyond attention to these factors, it is also suggested that stakeholders reach consensus 
on: what constitutes employment, and; what should be done to maximise employment 
in large-scale housing and informal settlement upgrades.  There was little consensus 
amongst those interviewed for the case studies of what constituted employment in the 
context of their projects and in general this could range form informal employment for 
a day to a longer term formal contract. 
 
Most of the sites for housing upgrade are also sites for the incremental upgrade of other 
public facilities, and for social development projects: – construction projects in 
infrastructure, public facilities, housing: – post-construction, the operation, 
maintenance and upgrade of the public (and private) building stock, and: - social 
development projects such as HIV awareness and upgrade of primary health-care 
networks, local economic development and technical skills training. The collective 
duration of these projects run into many years.  Unfortunately, in the majority of 
development sites, the projects are treated and managed as stand-alone projects, with 
insufficient effort at integrating and coordinating them.  There are opportunity costs of 
such a non-coordinated approach, especially in terms of lost employment opportunities. 
 
If the individual projects that occur on a development site were to be treated and 
consciously managed as components of a longer-term and holistic upgrade program, 
then potential for employment creation is much larger than the if the projects are treated 
and managed in isolation from each other.    
 
Recommendations emerging from the policy overview, the case studies and other 
secondary sources are summarised in the table below.  It should be noted that not all of 
these are universally applicable and in some cases they are already on the agenda of 
policy makers or urban development practitioners.  
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Summary of recommendations 
 
Housing 
regulations 
The manner in which regulations are drafted, interpreted and 
implemented impacts on what can be achieved.  Particular attention 
needs to be directed towards release of funds to projects, other 
funding sources to ensure a balance in the funds available for house 
construction vis a vis other investments in the built environment.   
 
Housing policy  Policy frameworks send signals to those making delivery decisions.  It 
is suggested that there be a shift away from “units are everything” 
approach to a more integrated approach, with explicit employment 
and local contractor development/sourcing outcomes specified in 
relation to housing projects. 
 
Matching funds 
and integration 
with other urban 
activities 
By developing an integrated package of funds, scope exists to 
leverage government resources in a better coordinated manner to 
achieve targets – encompassing skills development, infrastructure, 
community facilities and localised governance.  Alignment of Housing 
Subsidies, municipal Infrastructure Grants and funds for local 
economic development is essential. 
 
Housing 
implementation 
Numerous decisions are taken at the local level which impact on the 
nature of the housing delivery process itself and its alignment with 
other municipal activities.  Active and specialist management of these 
delivery interfaces could allow for further employment opportunities to 
be identified and acted on.  City-level EPWP units could prove useful 
in this. 
 
Technology, 
equipment and 
tools 
The technology used in the construction process can have substantial 
ramifications on labour usage.  Guidelines should be developed which 
specify which technology is preferred (note this is closely linked to the 
fast-tracking issue). 
 
Labour  Sourcing of local labour can improve project buy-in by beneficiaries 
and allow for a “sweat-equity” contribution.  There is a need for a 
community employment program that operates in advance of and 
after the implementation of projects. 
 
Materials  The cost of materials makes up a large proportion of the total cost of 
housing, infrastructure and public facilities projects.  Procurement 
policies and SME support programs relating to materials production 
and materials retailing could generate significant longer term 
employment opportunities.  To realise the employment potential 
around materials production & supply, attention would need to be 
given to contracting arrangements, specialised SME development 
processes, and the practical implementation of the Construction 
Industry Empowerment Charter. 
 
Local contractors  By building the capabilities and survival potential of local contractors, 
the scope exists to improve longer term employment opportunities.  
Critical in this is the bundling together of the employment 
opportunities that arise from housing, construction and operation of 
social facilities, and other urban services (such as solid waste 
removal). 
 
Involvement of 
CBOs 
Local residents typically seek and expect employment from local 
construction projects.  More effective management of community 
interfaces, and increasing the number of Peoples’ Housing Projects  
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could increase the number of local residents involved in the 
construction, maintenance and operation of built environment 
projects. 
Involvement of 
women 
Studies have shown that many beneficiary households are headed by 
women.  Often their household duties make it difficult for them to 
compete effectively for employment opportunities. Schemes (e.g. for 
the provision of daytime childcare) should be improved or put in place 
to enable local resident women to better take the employment 
opportunities that arise from development projects. 
 
Skills development  Through enhancing skills, the sustainability of employment 
opportunities is improved.  The alignment between housing delivery 
processes and skills development has often not been optimal.  There 
is a need to better align housing projects and skills development.  
City-level EPWP units could assist in this. 
 
Working conditions  Unsatisfactory working conditions are likely to detract from social 
development gains. The establishment of local labour committees and 
the adoption of local labour charters – as envisaged under Health & 
Safety regulations – could promote better local working conditions 
and improved local community participation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The report found that there is considerable potential to improve employment creation in 
housing projects in South Africa.  This is in line with findings in other studies such as 
those reported on by McCutcheon (2001) and Fitchett (2001).  However, the potential 
has not been fully realised, due to the constraints in policies, regulations, administrative 
processes, management, governance, and human capacity.  There are few explicit 
policy signals linking direct employment generation with housing.  Employment-
generation is however explicitly encouraged through other government departments, 
but these do not extend to housing policy. 
 
If employment-creation is to become a much more explicit objective within settlement-
related activity, then it will probably achieve the best results if urban development 
minimises the fragmented and narrowly framed interventions which have characterised 
human settlement programmes in South Africa to date, and instead maximises 
sustainable and holistic urban development models that emphasise community 
empowerment.   
 
This holistic approach requires far greater alignment of policies, the improvement of 
regulations, much closer inter-government coordination, and greater cooperation 
between government and CBOs, the private sector and NGOs.   
 
There is already some movement in this direction, but a concerted effort is required to 
strengthen and sustain this movement, and to translate it at scale into on-the-ground 
initiatives.  The ongoing capacity development and vigorous financial backing of local 
authorities will be needed so that they can scale up their work with local stakeholders to 
achieve greater employment impacts in what will hopefully remain for some time to 
come a major focus of government effort and expenditure. 
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1.  Introduction 
This report has been prepared with the intention, as stated in the International Labour 
Office (ILO) project terms of reference, to: 
  “Examine the employment aspects of past, present and future slum upgrading 
programs in South Africa, focusing on labour-intensive technologies, private sector 
involvement, community participation as well as skills development.”  
 
[ILO, 2005] 
 
The rationale behind the commissioning of such as study is that many countries, and in 
particular African countries, are showing limited progress in attaining the development 
targets of the Millennium Development Goals.  Through some discussion of the South 
African experience and the study of two housing / urban upgrade cases, this report 
offers some reflections on how the drive to upgrade urban living environments can be 
used to increase temporary unemployment relief and sustained employment.   
 
Since the mid-1990’s, housing has been a major focus of the democratic South African 
government.  Housing was a key element of the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP) in 1994 (Government of South Africa, 1994) and has remained a 
centre-piece of the government’s development programme.  The RDP, made explicit 
the need to connect the delivery of basic urban services with employment creation.  
Subsequent to the formulation of the RDP, the government had to contend with major 
economic challenges, in particular muted levels of growth and rising unemployment.  
Responses to these challenges, as articulated in polices such as the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution strategy (Government of South Africa, 1996), made 
macro-economic stability a key priority.  During the past decade significant process has 
been made in the delivery of basic services, housing and in creating a stable economic 
environment.  However, it is only really in the past few years that the intent to utilise 
government development programmes as an explicit employment generating strategy in 
a context of unemployment levels in excess of 30%, as originally articulated in the RDP 
(1994), has begun to be realised.  Although, despite this attention, employment 
generation in slum upgrading has not necessarily been seen as a major priority with a 
greater focus in programmes such as the Expanded Public Works Programme being 
geared towards bulk infrastructure provision and community-based social programmes. 
 
The report explores this context further and this discussion is supplemented by two case 
studies of housing and upgrading in very different contexts.  The findings of the policy 
overview and the case studies are then drawn on in making some recommendations on 
how employment gains could be leveraged in a more significant manner through South 
Africa shelter related endeavours. 
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2.  Methodology and limitations of the report 
This report examines the national policy context and two case studies.  The selection of 
the case studies was informed by a set of criteria meeting the ILO’s specifications, but 
also by logistical realities facing the report writers in accessing appropriately 
documented projects and people to interview.  The main source of material for the 
study has been existing information in the public domain.  This has included available 
project reports, external project assessments, policy statements, policy reviews, and in 
some cases academic work.  The material was supplemented by primary research, 
mainly through interviews with selected commentators.  The report also draws on the 
experience of its authors who are active urban development practitioners with several 
decades of collective experience.  Whilst there is a considerable amount of information 
available at the broad policy level, project level documentation is limited and in many 
cases does not document factors around employment as identified as relevant in the 
project terms of reference.  Where possible such gaps have been filled through drawing 
on the recollections and opinions of various stakeholders involved.  It should be noted 
that the report methodology was constrained, to some degree, by the fact that it was 
commissioned during South Africa’s December-January vacation period and therefore 
not all the most appropriate respondents were available for interviews and in some 
cases material could not be accessed timeously.  
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3.  The South African policy environment 
3.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
“The incontrovertible fact of our transition is that despite achievements in the economy, 
as a direct consequence of apartheid we remain a country with some steep 
contradictions.  Despite the huge public investment into housing over the last ten years 
of R29.5 billion, apartheid’s legacy remains strongly tenacious.  Now it threatens to 
scupper all that we carefully crafted and worked towards since we collectively began 
the transition in 1994.   
 
Between 1996 and 2001 the number of households living in shacks in informal 
settlements and backyards increased from 1.45 million to 1.84 million, reflecting an 
increase of 26 percent (a figure far greater than the 11% increase in population over the 
same period).  Approximately 2.4 million households live in informal housing 
structures.   
 
This is worsened by some major shifts in the housing need where households have 
become smaller and more numerous and have become more urbanised.  For, in informal 
settlements, the basic services and infrastructure that is the norm in our developed areas 
are lacking.  By reason of their spatial exclusion individuals and households experience 
difficulties in accessing all that they had been guaranteed as rights by the Constitution, 
namely; the right to basic amenities such as health and safety and security facilities.  
Incomes are low, exacerbating the twin challenges of inequality and poverty that 
continually expose the poor to extreme forms of vulnerability.”  
 
[Lindiwe Sisulu, Minister of Housing,, 22 September 2005] 
 
South Africa has large developmental backlogs that resulted from apartheid policies, 
but have persisted in the post-apartheid era.  The collapse of apartheid’s controls on the 
movement of black people in the late 1980s
1, led to an increase in the rate of 
urbanisation which had previously been artificially constrained.  Urban centres were ill-
equipped to handle this influx, and had in any case generally provided little in the way 
of services to already urbanised black communities.  The urbanisation of the 1980s was 
evidenced by the growth of large-scale informal settlements, overcrowding of existing 
township housing units and hostels, and the pervasive construction of back-yard shacks.   
 
Today close to half of South Africa’s 44 million people live in urban centres.  A third 
of those in the major urban centres live in informal settlements [South African Cities 
Network, 2004].  Despite considerable government efforts to transform urban 
environments and deal with developmental challenges such as education and health, 
many people continue to live in poverty and suffer a lack of access to basic services.  
This has been aggravated by unemployment at 50% or more within many of these 
largest urban settlements.   
 
                                                 
1 Apartheid’s urban controls had originally been imposed through the enforcement of the Group 
Areas Act and Influx Control measures and involved large scale destruction of existing black 
urban settlements such as Sophiatown, District Six and Cato Manor.  
4 
According to the draft National Urban Policy and Strategy Framework: 
“The Labour Force Survey of September 2001 found that 54.4% of the unemployed in 
South Africa are located in urban areas
2.  Statistics for the same year show that of the 
7.8 million people of working age in the nine largest cities, 38% did not have a job.”  
 
[DPLG, 2004: p19] 
 
Policy evolution in the past decade 
This historical context has obviously influenced development policies in South Africa 
in the past decade.  This section seeks to summarise those development policies on 
shelter provision and employment and to describe the degree to which these somewhat 
separate polices have intersected.  This policy discussion is not aimed at being 
exhaustive as there is other material available on these subjects, but it does seek to 
provide a sense of context and highlight key issues pertaining to the interaction of 
housing related development processes and responses to South Africa’s sustained high 
levels of unemployment. 
 
Development policies in South Africa have been overlaid by the policy of incremental 
decentralisation to local government of decision-making powers over social and 
economic development [1996 National Constitution, South African Government].  The 
rationale for the decentralisation is that municipalities face the greatest challenge in 
meeting human needs and addressing past backlogs and spatial distortions.  The 1998 
Local Government White Paper [DPLG, 1998] and supporting legislation proposed the 
developmental local government theory.  In theory, local government is the institutional 
hinge on which the successful implementation of urban development policies depend.  
However, the practice required a complex set of inter-governmental relations. 
 
After the 1994 elections, the democratic government launched the RDP (Government 
of South Africa, 1994) in response to the country’s legacy of apartheid and to 
contribute towards the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist country.  The 
RDP, developed by the ANC-led alliance in consultation with other mass organisations, 
non-government organisations (NGOs) and research organisations, describes the 
country’s policies regarding social and economic development. 
 
The RDP focused on five major policy programmes: 
  Meeting basic needs; 
  Developing our human resources; 
  Building the economy; 
  Democratising the state and society; and 
  Implementing the RDP 
[ANC, 1994].
3 
 
Under the ‘meeting basic needs’ program, the RDP endorsed the principle that all South 
Africans have a right to a secure place in which to live in peace and dignity, and that 
housing is a human right.  One of the RDP's first priorities was to provide for the 
homeless.   
 
                                                 
2 Department of Public Works (2003)
 
3 The RDP was developed prior to 1994.  And subsequent to the 1994 elections formally 
adopted by Parliament.  
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In June 1996, the Minister of Finance published the country’s macro-economic 
strategy, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy, otherwise known as 
GEAR (Government of South Africa, 1996).  GEAR argued for market-driven 
economic expansion and growth.  The aim of the strategy was to strengthen economic 
growth, to broaden employment, and to redistribute economic opportunities.  However, 
the strategy was underpinned by a strong focus on stabilisation requiring government to 
curtail expenditure in order to significantly reduce the government deficit and to 
liberalise many aspects of macro-economic, trade and industrial policy in an 
accelerated manner.  This not only generated a process of major structural change in the 
economy, resulting in considerable formal employment losses in the private and public 
spheres, but also reduced the ability of the state, in the short-term, to respond 
effectively to rising social needs.  Weak domestic growth and global economic 
instability also contributed to the persistence of ‘jobless growth’, with an apparent loss 
of a million jobs between 1990 and 2000 being one of the most unfortunate features of 
a generally optimistic decade (Nel & Binns, 2001).  In addition, some of the early post-
apartheid government programmes experienced operational difficulties consequently 
did not result in the expected scale of job creation.   The table below from the UNDP’s 
South Africa Human Development Report 2003 (2004), provides an indication of the 
real impacts of South Africa’s immediate post-apartheid economic policies on 
expenditure allocations. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of general government real per capita expenditure (Rand constant 1995 prices) 
 
  Current Expenditure  Capital Expenditure 
Category  1995  2002  1995  2002 
General administration  346  422  57  45 
Defence 270  210  0  8 
Law and order  344  376  23  19 
Education 789  715  73  60 
Health 366  373  22  18 
Social security and welfare  184  214  74  64 
Economic  services  245  27 85 71 
Total 2,544  2,537  334  287 
[Source: UNDP, 2004] 
 
With this in mind, it is therefore not surprising that according to the South Africa 
Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP, 2004) concluded that, 
“In South Africa, unemployment continues to rise unabated. The economy provided 
only 11.56 million jobs for 16.81 million economically active South Africans in March 
2003, resulting in 5.25 million unemployed, or an official unemployment rate of 31.2 
per cent, which is substantially higher than the 19.3 per cent unemployment rate in 
1996.” 
[UNDP, 2004: p10] 
 
McCord (2004) describes South Africa’s approach to this employment scenario in the 
following manner, 
“The Government’s employment strategy is based on two assumptions, i) that 
economic growth will lead to increased employment, and ii) that improved education 
will to enable workers to take up the skilled employment opportunities which will arise 
as a result of economic growth (EPWP 2004), and hence policies are focused around 
promoting growth and education.  To this is added a public works component to  
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provide employment in the short term, pending the realization of increased employment 
arising from growth and improved labour supply.” 
[McCord, 2004: p 3] 
 
The sections which follow outline some of the relevant aspects of settlement and 
employment-related policies in South Africa’s development agenda in the past decade 
and seek to identify key points of intersection between the two. 
 
3.2 URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING 
The Department of Provincial and Local Government produced Urban and Rural 
Development Frameworks 1996 in order to provide policy guidelines for the 
development of urban and rural areas, especially around infrastructure, housing, and 
local economic development.  These frameworks focused on integration, poverty 
alleviation, redressing past imbalances through participatory planning, and protecting 
the environment for future generations (du Plessis & Napier, 2001).  The frameworks 
aimed to promote urban reconstruction and development, to guide development policies 
and to steer them towards the achievement of a collective vision.  The intended results 
of the frameworks were that, by 2020 South African urban settlements will be:  
 
  “Spatially and socio-economically integrated, non-segregated, free of racial and 
gender discrimination, enabling people to make residential and employment choices 
to pursue their ideals; 
  “Centres of economic, environmental and social opportunity where people can live 
and work in safety and peace; 
  “Centres of vibrant urban governance, managed by democratic, efficient, 
sustainable and accountable metropolitan and local governments in close co-
operation with civil society and geared towards innovative community-led 
development; 
  “Environmentally sustainable, marked by a balance between a quality built 
environment and open space; and between consumption needs and renewable and 
non-renewable resources.  Sustainable development meets the needs of the present 
while not compromising the needs of future generations; 
  “Planned for in a highly participative fashion that promotes the integration and 
sustainability of urban environments; 
  “Marked by housing, infrastructure and effective services for households and 
business as the basis for an equitable standard of living;  
  “Integrated industrial, commercial, residential, information and educational centres, 
which provide easy access to a range of urban resources; 
  “[Areas which provide much] greater access for rural people to government support 
and information and to commercial services, with a more logical spatial network of 
towns, services, roads and transport systems serving both market traders and 
customers; and 
  “[Areas which provide close] availability of water, sanitation and fuel sources, 
giving everyone more time for economic productivity and better health.” 
 
[Department of Housing, 1997] 
 
Similar intentions had been expressed in the Housing White Paper (1994).  It set out 
government’s broad housing policy and strategy.  Since 1994, housing policy has 
evolved.  The current housing policy exists within Housing White Paper and the Urban 
and Rural Development frameworks (1996).  The Housing Act aligned the National  
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Housing Policy with the Constitution of South Africa and clarified the roles of the three 
spheres of government: national, provincial and municipal.  In addition the Housing 
Act lays down administrative procedures for the development of the National Housing 
Policy. 
 
[Department of Housing, 1997] 
 
The impact of housing policy 
The impact of South Africa’s post-apartheid housing policy has been profound.  Since 
the launch of the White Paper on Housing (1994) until March 2005 more than 1,8 
million houses were provided to more than seven million people.   
 
[Department of Housing, 2005].   
 
Figure 2: Houses completed or under construction March 2005 
 
 
 
[Source: reproduced from www.housing.gov.za ]  
 
Breaking New Ground 
Within the broader housing and urban development policy environment, Government 
has in the last decade tested a variety of implementation approaches and plans.  Most 
recently the Government introduced the Comprehensive Housing Plan for the 
Development of Integrated Sustainable Human Settlements - more popularly referred to 
as Breaking New Ground (BNG).  BNG provides for comprehensive oversight by 
government in promoting the residential property market.  BNG envisages the 
development of low-cost, medium-density and rental housing; stronger partnerships 
with the private sector, and the provision of social infrastructure and amenities.  BNG 
aims at changing spatial settlement patterns, so as to build multicultural communities in 
a non-racial society.   
 
According to BNG, the Government takes responsibility for providing the poorest with 
income levels below R1 500 p.m.  (ca.  € 200) with a full housing subsidy of R 31 929 
(ca € 4 600).  The poor with income levels R1 500 to R3 500 p.m.  (ca € 200 to € 500) 
will also receive the full subsidy and will be required to provide either a cash 
contribution or sweat equity.  A newly created subsidy band targets middle-income  
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earners – those earning R3 500 to R7 000 p.m.  (ca € 500 to € 1 000) for whom 
government will pay a housing deposit.   
 
Whilst BNG still needs to stand the test of implementation, Government policy- makers 
suggest that BNG has the following advantages:  
  There will be greater flexibility in delivery systems, the lack of which previously 
constrained delivery  
  The role of the private sector will be enhanced through the collapsing of subsidy 
bands, and the removal of blockages relating to down-payments for indigents and 
pensioners.  A fixed rate and other new loan products will be developed, including 
an option to convert the capital grant into an annuity.   
  Barriers to housing trade will be removed through amendments to the Housing Act, 
1997 (Act 107 of 1997), so as to reduce from eight to five years the period during 
which resale on the private market is prohibited.   
  Registration of title will be prioritised for houses constructed under the existing 
Housing Programme.   
  All housing programmes will focus on replacing informal settlements with more 
adequate forms of housing.   
  Greater co-ordination will be effected between national, provincial and local 
government.  An Inter-Ministerial Committee will oversee the implementation of 
BNG. 
 
Other initiatives to be carried out in terms of BNG include land acquisition through the 
proactive identification and acquisition of land through the Public Works Asset 
Register, the State Land Register and the Environmental Potential Atlas.  The Plan will 
be implemented from April 2005.
4 
 
The housing Social Contract 
Significant within the BNG commitments is the Social Contract that was approved by 
major housing-related stakeholders in 2005.  The Social Contract included a number of 
commitments to leverage housing-related processes for economic and social gain (see 
italicised sections below). 
 
“We the signatories undertake to work together to: 
a.  “Unblock the impediments constraining a fast-tracked process of housing delivery; 
b.  “Enable rapid release of land that is well located, for the purpose of creating 
sustainable and viable communities; 
c.  “Create a sustainable and a viable new and secondary housing market; 
d.  “Extend access to affordable finance and, where possible, with shorter repayment 
periods for all South Africans; 
e.  “Mobilize communities to be active participants within the construction processes 
through the provision of technical support and skills development; 
f.  “Enable the individuals and families to use their homes as assets to create wealth; 
g.  “Actively promote the empowerment of previously disadvantaged individuals, 
especially women and youth; and 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that a practice note issued by the Dept of Housing ca May 2005 (on the topic 
of the new subsidy quantum for the 2006 financial year) refers to an intention that land for 
housing will be paid for separately from the housing subsidy.  This presents an opportunity to 
ensure a greater level of investment in the top structure.  
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h.  “Develop policies and mechanisms to deal with HIV/AIDS in housing, and access 
to housing finance. 
 
“In addition, we, the signatories undertake to work together to mobilize the required 
resources to achieve the following elements of the Human Settlements Plan: 
a.  ”Accelerating the delivery of housing as a key strategy for poverty alleviation; 
b.  “Utilising provision of housing as a major job creation strategy; 
c.  “Ensuring property can be accessed by all as an asset for wealth creation and 
empowerment; 
d.  “Leveraging growth in the economy; 
e.  “Combating crime, promoting social cohesion and improving the quality of life of 
the poor in safe and secure environments; 
f.  “Supporting the functioning of the entire single residential property market to 
reduce the duality within the sector by breaking the barriers between the first and 
second economy; 
g.  “Utilizing housing as an instrument for the development of sustainable human 
settlements, in support of spatial restructuring, and 
h.  ”Ensuring, as a matter of urgency, the extension of adequate water, sanitation and 
hygiene, lighting and energy, such as electricity, to all.” 
 
[Department of Housing, 2005, italics by the authors of this report] 
 
To date it appears the commitment in the Social Contract under the “Breaking New 
Ground” framework has yielded little in specific commitments.  The bulk of attention 
appears, at present, to be placed on escalating private sector commitments and 
improving access to finance on the one hand and promoting integration of housing with 
other urban processes on the other.  Nevertheless, the presence of this explicit 
commitment does create the space to conceptualise projects which begin systematically 
make employment creation a critical focus.   
 
The People’s Housing Process (PHP) 
In housing delivery, some emphasis has been placed on projects implemented under the 
PHP.  The PHP methodology regards as advantages the involvement of beneficiary 
communities in the housing process as labour or as contractors in the delivery of shelter 
(commonly referred to as ‘top-structures’) and associated services.   
 
The establishment of partnerships, the transfer of skills, community empowerment and 
a process that is people-driven were some of the key principles underlying this policy.  
The policy was introduced in 1998. 
 
The People’s Housing Process “aims to support households who wish to enhance their 
subsidies by building or organising the building of their homes themselves.  The 
process assists such households to access:  
o  “Housing subsidies  
o  “Technical, financial, logistical and administrative support regarding the building of 
their homes, on a basis that is sustainable and affordable” 
 
[Housing Code Part 3 Chapter 8: Housing Subsidy Scheme / People’s Housing Process] 
 
Under the PHP beneficiaries can:   
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o  “save on labour costs by doing some of the building work themselves or by getting 
their neighbours, friends and families or other persons to help them;  
o  “avoid having to pay a profit element to developers if they build houses themselves 
or organise for those houses to be built;  
 
[Housing Code Part 3 Chapter 8: Housing Subsidy Scheme / People’s Housing Process] 
 
The PHP is a delivery mechanism (as opposed to a type of subsidy).  With some minor 
modifications, it utilises the same housing subsidy types (Greenfields, Consolidation, 
Institutional et al) that are available for delivery of housing stock via more conventional 
mechanisms. 
 
Statistics on delivery (houses built or under construction) via the PHP mechanism could 
not be readily located during the research period.  However, an alternative indicator of 
scale of the use of the PHP mechanism is the number of subsidy approvals.  By March 
2004, subsidies approved for delivery via PHP totalled 272 165 (since the inception of 
the PHP mechanism in 1998).  This represented 11.17% of all of the 2 436 404 housing 
subsidies approved from 1994 to 2004.   
 
It is presently unclear if the proportion of subsidies to be delivered via PHP will remain 
at this level, increase, or decrease.  There does not appear to be an express strategy at a 
national level as the relative emphasis to be placed on the PHP mechanism.  The 
implication appears to be that the various Provincial Housing Departments and-or 
municipalities will individually set their own particular approach as to the relative 
weight on PHP compared to other delivery mechanisms.  Systematic research was not 
however undertaken to determine each province’s or selected municipalities’ PHP 
intentions.   
 
However, as the opinion below suggests, progress in scaling up the PHP has been rather 
disappointing: 
“Although the PHP has been part of national housing policy since 1998, most provinces 
have disregarded it in favour of project-based, developer-driven delivery.  Only a tiny 
proportion of houses built to date have been delivered via the PHP.  The official PHP 
policy framework is vague and contradictory, both internally and in relation to other 
policy frameworks such as the urban planning process and building norms and 
standards.  Moreover, the institutional home of the PHP in government, the People’s 
Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT), is under-resourced and politically marginalised.”  
 
[Baumann, 2003] 
 
BNG has placed some emphasis on scaling up PHP projects.  Some Provinces suggest 
that they will increase their PHP targets.  At the time of writing there was however no 
numerical indication of increased resources for PHP to suggest that this will receive the 
intended attention. 
 
Urban renewal programmes 
Beyond housing-related matters government has also given significant attention to 
matters or urban renewal since the policy frameworks of the mid 1990s.  Urban 
development programmes more generally have been informed by polices developed by 
the Department of Provincial and Local Government.  Early flagship interventions 
under the urban policy frameworks focused on the Special Integrated Presidential  
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Projects (SIP Projects).  The aim of the SIP Projects was to kick-start development in 
major urban areas, focusing on violence-torn communities and those in crisis.  These 
selected interventions were also seen to provide an opportunity for donor funds to be 
raised in support of national priority interventions.  It was developed to ensure an 
integrated approach to the provision of infrastructure, housing, community and 
recreation facilities, and job opportunities.  The SIP Projects aimed to transform 
previously disadvantaged communities and create sustainable and habitable living 
environments.  Projects that received attention under this programme included:  
 
o  Eastern Cape: Duncan Village and Ibhayi  
o  Free State: Thabong  
o  Gauteng: Katorus  
o  KwaZulu-Natal: Cato Manor  
o  Limpopo: Mahwelereng  
o  Mpumalanga: Masoyi and Siyabuswa  
o  Northern Cape: Galeshewe  
o  North West: Molopo River Basin  
o  Western Cape: Integrated Service Land Project in the Cape Metropolitan Area.   
 
It was intended that these projects would include the provision of housing, 
infrastructure (such as roads and the provision of electricity and street-lighting) 
upgrading, and the upgrading of social infrastructure (child-care facilities, schools, 
clinics, sports fields, libraries, police stations, and centres for the aged, post offices and 
playgrounds).  Providing areas for markets, community gardens and skills training 
creates opportunities for business development.  These activities are planned and 
implemented in an integrated manner to ensure sustainable and habitable living 
environments. 
 
In addition to these activities the DPLG has administered a series of grant funds for 
local governments with the aim that they make applications for particular initiatives.  
These included the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) and the 
Local Economic Development (LED) Fund.  More recently the DPLG launched the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) in August 2004.  This is aimed at fast tracking 
improved service delivery from municipalities.  The R15,6-billion grant fund is aimed 
at encouraging economic development at municipal level and improving service from 
local government.  Approximately R4,4 billion has been allocated for the 2004/2005 
financial year for municipalities to invest in basic services and infrastructure – above 
the projections made in 2004 in the table below.  This amount will increase to R6 
billion for the 2006/2007 financial year.  Data from 2003 national budget allocations to 
municipalities is reflected in the table below.  These figures exclude housing as this is 
funded via a grant to provincial governments.  The scale of housing-related transfers, 
via the National Department of Housing, to provincial and local governments is 
significant and has amounted to R32.4 billion since the 1994/1995 budget year (up to 
and including 2004/2005) (National Treasury, 2005: p 67).  The annual housing grant to 
provinces amounted to R4.5 billion in 2004/2005 (ibid: p69). 
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Figure 3: National government transfers to local government (2003) 
 
 
[Source: reproduced from National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal review, 2004: p12] 
 
The Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) is a conditional grant to support municipal 
capital budgets in order to fast track service delivery at municipal level.  The grant 
allows government to expand and improve the quality of service delivery relating to 
water provision, sanitation, roads, solid waste and lighting.  The MIG has been set up to 
facilitate the merger of the following funding programmes: 
 
  Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme, in support of internal bulk, 
connector infrastructure and community facilities to poor households;  
  Water Service Capital Fund, in support of bulk, connector and internal 
infrastructure for water services at a basic level;  
  Community based Extended Public Works Programme, in support of the creation of 
community assets in rural, historically disadvantaged communities;  
  Local Economic Development Fund, in support of planning, and implementation of 
job creation and poverty alleviation;  
  Sport and Recreation Programme, in support of the provision and operation of sport 
and recreation facilities within disadvantaged communities; and  
  Electrification funding, in support of addressing the electrification backlog of 
permanently occupied residential dwellings that are situated in historically under-
supplied areas.   
 
The MIG is an infrastructure transfer mechanism and is aimed at making the system of 
transfers to municipalities more efficient, designed to support the capital budgets of 
municipalities, and to facilitate integrated development planning.  As the MIG is 
designed to complement the capital budgets of municipalities rather than to fund 
individual projects, reporting on spending is therefore on the entire capital budget of  
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municipalities.  Individual national line departments will therefore continue to lead the 
monitoring and support of implementation in their specific functions and priorities 
 
The MIG has an overall target of removing the backlog with regard to access to basic 
municipal services over a 10-year period.  It is estimated that the infrastructure 
investment programme for all municipal infrastructure over a 10-year period requires 
an investment of R56 billion, of which an estimated R38 billion is assumed to be MIG-
funded with the remainder provided through the Housing Subsidy. 
 
What is noteworthy about the MIG in the context of this study is the degree to which 
conditions for approved projects have been integrated with the goals of the Extended 
Public Works Programme and its aims of generating employment (see discussion of 
EPWP below). 
 
A similar emphasis on linking urban development policy to economic growth and 
employment creation can be found in draft versions of the revised urban development 
framework (2005) being tabled by the DPLG with the cabinet at the time of the writing 
of this report.  However, the emerging documentation around urban development 
policies does make explicit the opportunity that exists to link employment creation to 
the urban development process (housing and services) and tends to talk more generally 
about the need to stimulate economic activity in the urban environment through more 
traditional LED-type approaches. 
 
The relative importance of making this connection is best made when looking at the 
allocations of government capital expenditure at the local level.  The figure below 
makes the point very clearly that housing has been and remains a dominant category of 
state expenditure at the local level and such does require attention in terms of its 
employment generation impacts in addition to the sustainability issues that are now 
characterising urban development debates in the country. 
 
Figure 4: Total budgeted expenditure on infrastructure in SA municipalities 
 
[Source: reproduced from National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 2004:p 34]  
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3.3 GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
The government has, since 1994, in many ways staked its reputation on attempts to 
initially stabilise the economy so poorly mismanaged under apartheid and then to turn-
around the country’s economic fortunes to meet the goals of redistribution and growth.  
Whilst the RDP emphasised growth through redistribution,  with the adoption of the 
GEAR framework emphasis shifted to redistribution through growth.  GEAR identified 
the following goals as requiring significant attention: 
 
  A competitive and fast-growing economy which creates enough jobs for all work-
seekers;  
  A redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor;  
  A society in which sound health, education and other services are available to all; 
and 
  An environment in which homes are secure and places of work are productive  
 
[National Treasury, 1996] 
 
However, GEAR itself focused almost entirely on the economic dimensions and had 
three core strategies.  Firstly, it aimed at promoting growth through exports.  Secondly 
it aimed at increasing local and foreign investments through the creation of an attractive 
and stable domestic investment environment.  Thirdly, it promoted wealth 
redistribution by creating jobs, and reallocating resources (via budget reforms)in order 
to make adequate provision for essential services like water, housing, education, social 
services and health (National Treasury, 1996; Dept of Housing, 1997). 
 
GEAR stabilised the economy but did not yield expected levels of foreign direct 
investment.  Increases in domestic investment and levels of growth and employment 
remained muted for much of the 1990s.  Figure 3.2 provides a stark illustration of the 
situation where despite some job creation, levels of unemployment rose rapidly during 
this period.   
 
Figure 5: Employment and unemployment levels 1996-2003 
SA Unemployment (Extended definition) and Employment changes (Source: Global Insight)
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Years
T
o
t
a
l
Unemployment
Employment
 
  
15 
The late 1990s witnessed a government seeking to respond more proactively to this 
situation which was beginning to fragment the support of the social partners it had 
depended on in the previous years.  A series of Presidential summits sought to secure 
commitments from government, business, labour and NGOs to seek innovative ways to 
increase levels of employment.  Out of these summits government launched a series of 
Special Employment Programmes with public funding that would, it hoped, generate 
employment alongside its commitments to the growth strategy. 
 
Over the coming years, the package of Special Employment Programmes will be 
dramatically expanded, with greater attention paid to the finance stream, improved 
coordination of activities, sustainability, training and the contribution to local economic 
activity.  The six programmes given priority include: 
 
  Clean Cities Campaign 
Currently there are an estimated 15 000 employees in the waste management 
industry.  A National Waste Management Strategy is currently being developed, 
with an emphasis on promoting SMMEs in order to increase the potential for the 
creation of jobs through the delivery of waste services to poorly serviced areas.  The 
Clean Cities Campaign will implement municipal waste collection in poorly 
serviced areas, linking into small recycling operations to facilitate the sustainability 
of the programme.  The Campaign will also enable the creation and maintenance of 
recreation facilities and support some inner-city building rehabilitation. 
 
  Working for Water 
Working for Water is a short-term job creation and conservation project that 
provides employment through the clearing and controlling of invasive alien 
vegetation.  Approximately 38 000 direct short term jobs have been created since 
project implementation with the majority of those employed being rural women in 
KwaZulu/Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Northern Province and Mpumalanga.   
 
[www.dwaf.gov.za/wfw/] 
 
  Land Care Campaign 
The Land Care Campaign is a community-based programme supported by both the 
public and private sectors through a series of partnerships.  It focuses on the 
rehabilitation and conservation of natural resources (soil, water sources and 
vegetation) through sustainable utilisation and the creation of a conservation ethic 
through education and awareness.  In addition, it seeks to address rural poverty 
through sustainable job creation.  The Land Care Campaign reinforces the Working 
for Water Programme by supporting social upliftment and contributing to 
sustainable job creation and the development of entrepreneurial skills. 
 
  Municipal Infrastructure Programme 
The Municipal Infrastructure Programme (MIP) and Community Water and 
Sanitation Programmes channel capital subsidies to investment in basic service 
infrastructure for low-income households and towards the rehabilitation of 
collapsed infrastructure in previously disadvantaged areas.  It is connected to the 
housing subsidy programme in its provision of bulk infrastructure in municipalities 
for low-income housing projects.  The MIP has an urban focus although about one-
quarter of the funds are spent in rural areas. 
[www.dplg.gov.za]  
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  Welfare Programmes 
Government’s aim appears to be to redirect welfare spending away from 
programmes that promote dependency towards those that make social investments 
by building human resources and social assets.  The Department of Welfare has 
embarked on several initiatives to make the shift towards this developmental 
welfare agenda.  Based on the poverty profiles of provinces, it has designed a social 
development programme that includes the pilot Flagship Programme for 
Unemployed Women with Children Under Five.  These projects are meant to offer 
opportunities for unemployed, poor rural women with young children to break out 
of hardship and poverty by providing training, education and social resources. 
 
  Community Based Public Works Programmes (CBPWP) 
The CBPWP is aimed at poverty alleviation through job creation, primarily focused 
on the rural poor.  The objectives are to create short-term employment opportunities 
for community members by means of construction of public assets within poor, 
disadvantaged areas.  Sustainability of these employment opportunities will be 
extended through the facilitation of micro business opportunities associated with the 
community assets created.  Recent evaluation has shown that this programme has 
successfully reached poor communities, as demonstrated by those employed and 
trained, and by the spatial distribution of activities.  Over 900 projects have been 
implemented, mainly in rural areas, creating about 41 650 person-years of 
employment.  In 1998/9, the programme focused on creating productive assets and 
assets that improve access to markets for rural communities.  A greater emphasis 
will be placed on improving coordination with an emphasis on social assistance and 
the development of sustainable community assets.  The aim is to improve 
coordination and spatial targeting of initiatives to reduce waste and dramatically 
enhance the effectiveness of each programme (NEDLAC) 
 
  Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) 
Like the CBPWP, the primary focus of the EPWP is the creation of temporary 
employment through the construction of public assets.  Unlike the CBPWP 
program, the EPWP does not focus only on the alleviation of rural poverty.  The 
EPWP is a successor program to the CPWP, and was established  in 2004.  The 
EPWP is overseen through a special unit in the Department of Public Works, but it 
is implemented largely through reorientation of existing budgets in the different 
spheres of government.  The Programme's objectives are to use existing government 
and public entity budgets to reduce and alleviate unemployment and increase the 
ability of workers to earn an income, either through the labour market or through 
entrepreneurial activity.  The goal is to alleviate unemployment for a minimum of 
one million people (at least 60% women, 30% youth and 2% disabled people) in 
South Africa between 2004 and 2009 (www.dpw.gov.za).
5  According to the 
Department of Public Works, 
“The EPWP is one of an array of government strategies aimed at addressing 
unemployment. The fundamental strategies are to increase economic growth so that 
the number of net new jobs being created starts to exceed the number of new 
                                                 
5 A leading project under this programme (and first initiated under the CBPW programme) is the 
African Renaissance Road Building project in rural KwaZulu-Natal.  Its Zibambele project is one 
of a number of initiatives which have empowered low income rural communities to undertake 
maintenance and repair contracts on rural roads.    
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entrants into the labour market, and to improve the education system such that the 
workforce is able to take up the largely skilled work opportunities which economic 
growth will generate. In the meantime, there is a need to put in place short- to 
medium-term strategies. The EPWP forms one of government’s short-to medium-
term strategies.” 
[Department of Public Works, 2003 as quoted in McCord, 2004: p 7]. 
 
The EPWP focuses on 4 sectors: 
 
¾  Infrastructure programme: This programme focuses on creating employment 
through civil works projects employing labour-intensive methods of 
construction.  Approximately 37,000 km of roads, 31,000 km of pipelines, 1,500 
km of storm water drains and 150 km of urban sidewalks will be constructed.  
This will result in 750,000 temporary employment opportunities for targeted 
unemployed people in the areas where the projects take place.  (Since the 
average duration of these projects is four months, this translates to 250,000 
person-years of employment.) All the workers employed on these projects will 
receive training, funded by the Department of Labour.   
 
¾  Economic programme: The economic sector's learnership programme aims to 
include 3,000 unemployed people in entrepreneurship learnerships over the next 
five years.  It is estimated that each micro-enterprise established will employ an 
additional three people.  The Learnership programme will help aspiring 
entrepreneurs to develop the skills and experience needed to set up SMMEs.  
Learners will be registered on full-time Sector Education and Training 
Authority (SETA)funded learnerships and supported to set up micro-business.  
Learning contracts will provide practical experience for learners.  The learners 
will graduate from their learnerships with a National Qualifications Framework 
qualification, the necessary technical knowledge to run their businesses, 
knowledge of how to tender for public sector projects, knowledge of how to run 
a business, experience, and a credit track record. 
 
¾  Environmental programme: Approximately 202 000 temporary jobs will be 
created through programmes such as: 
 
o  Land Care programme 
o  People and Parks initiative 
o  Coastal Care programme 
o  Sustainable Land-based Livelihoods project 
o  Cleaning up SA programme 
o  Growing a Tourism Economy programme 
o  Working for Water 
o  Wetlands project 
o  Fire programme 
 
The Fire programme will result in the clearing of alien vegetation from 200,000 
hectares of land, rehabilitation of 40 wetlands, the creation of 20 fire protection 
associations, clean up of 700 kilometres of coast, rehabilitation of 10,000 
hectares of land, creation of 32 waste management programmes and creation of 
150 historical and community tourism projects.  
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¾  Social Development Programme: Two programmes in the social development 
sector have been earmarked for the EPWP for 2004/5: 
 
o  Home Community Based Care  
o  Early Childhood Development 
 
The Home Community Based Care programme aims to create 122,240 
temporary work opportunities (17,400 of which will be through learnerships) 
over five years through a three pronged programme run in partnership with the 
Health and Welfare Sector Education Authority.  The Early Childhood 
Development programme aims to develop skills amongst 19,800 childcare 
practitioners over a period of five years, thereby increasing their capacity to 
generate an income and at the same time improve the care and learning 
environment of our children. 
 
  Employment Strategy Framework (ESF) 
Framed within the context of Government’s macro-economic targets, the 
Employment Strategy Framework (ESF) was launched in early 2005 and focuses on 
ways of raising the demand for, and the employability of, labour.  The ESF has a 
short-term goal to directly and indirectly promote the creation of sufficient numbers 
of jobs to match net growth in the labour force.  This will be done through the 
support and expansion of the Special Employment Programmes to raise the level of 
job creation as quickly as possible.  Even where these are short-term employment 
generators, they will focus on building important community assets and reinforcing 
programmes, aimed at generating longer-term economic opportunities. 
 
In the medium to long term, the strategy aims to fundamentally propel the South 
African economy into one which is innovative, inclusive and labour absorbing by 
raising the skills base and move into higher value-added sectors to raise national 
income, enable a more stable exchange rate and to better reflect our underlying cost 
structure.   
 
To increase the demand for labour, emphasis in policy documents has been placed 
on:  
 
o  Expanding the creation of sustainable formal sector employment through the 
identification and promotion of higher value added, more labour using industries, 
with strong employment multiplier potential. 
o  Preserving sustainable jobs in traditional sectors by identifying strategies with 
respect to work organisation, products and markets. 
o  Improving access for small business to economic opportunities, with improved 
access to land, finance and support services. 
o  Expanding the Special Employment Programmes to raise the level of job 
creation as quickly as possible.  Although these are short term employment 
generators, improved coordination with local planning, private sector promotion 
activities and human resource development programmes should enable the 
building of important community assets and of entry points to longer-term 
opportunities.    
19 
o  Pursuing a number of sectorally-focused initiatives where there could be quick 
but sustainable employment creation, as in services such as tourism, and in 
certain goods destined for the local market. 
o  Improving the overall investment environment by reducing uncertainty caused 
by, for example, high crime rates, and by reducing the cost of doing business by, 
for example, improving the provision of commercial and public transport. 
 
To improve the employability of labour, emphasis will be placed on:  
 
o  Improving the functioning of labour markets, with an emphasis on geographic 
and occupational mobility, greater adaptability to changing circumstances, a 
more appropriate regulatory framework, reduced occupational discrimination 
and improved absorption of new entrants. 
o  Improving education and training levels, with an emphasis on better 
coordination in the responses of secondary and tertiary education to labour 
market needs, dramatic improvements in the provision of basic education, and 
the institutional transformation of the system of industrial skilling. 
o  Improving the delivery and cost-efficiency in social security systems and 
ensuring greater accessibility of social and infrastructure services. 
o  Creating a more efficient, flexible and proactive public service will be essential 
to achieving this vision.  Enhancing the productivity of public expenditure will 
require improvements in the allocation of financial resources, in the deployment 
of public servants, in work organisation and in programme coordination. 
 
[www.polity.org.za] 
 
  Accelerated Growth and Development Strategy 
Late 2005 witnessed government launching its Accelerated Growth and 
Development Strategy with the aim of boosting economic growth in order that 
levels of poverty and unemployment will decline at a greater pace that has been the 
case to date.  This Strategy also involves substantially increasing levels of public 
investment in the economic sphere through infrastructure, but also in terms of basic 
needs and service delivery.  Emphasis is placed in public pronouncements on the 
new approach, which seeks to attain 6% growth for the country by 2014, on 
ensuring that employment opportunities are maximised where possible.  In 2005 
South Africa’s economic growth approach 4% and for the first time in decades 
some net increases in employment over unemployment growth were seen. 
 
3.4 COMMENTARY 
The recent policy improvements to human settlements (and Breaking New Ground 
framework being perhaps the most visible of the policy improvements), combined with 
expanded levels of public and private investment, stronger economic growth and 
attention being paid to employment in all spheres of public sector activity, presents an 
opportunity for considerable innovation and scaling up of activities.  The Department of 
Housing (2005) estimated that, in 1997, every R1million invested in the housing sector 
generated 57 direct and 86 indirect temporary employment opportunities.  While these 
are not sustainable jobs, they do make an important short-term contribution.  It is 
estimated that the Government’s low-income housing programme generated 109 445 
direct and 164 168 indirect temporary employment opportunities in 1997, with an 
expenditure of almost R2 billion on the subsidy programme.  The cost of each  
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employment opportunity has fallen by 15-20% since the inception of the programme 
and there have been incremental improvements in levels of attention being placed on 
employment issues and in the approaches adopted. 
 
Employment generation is now articulated as an objective in the policy frameworks 
both at a general urban development level and specifically in relation to shelter issues.  
However, this has, in many cases not translated into effective actions as pressures at the 
implementation level often focus on outputs other than those related to employment.  
Whilst the emergence of the EPWP has allowed for considerably greater attention to be 
paid to opportunities in the housing delivery pipeline, this has tended to focus on bulk-
services as opposed to other elements of the delivery process.  However, in reflecting 
on the role of the EPWP it is important to keep in mind criticisms made of the 
programme such as that by McCord (2004):  
“… the EPWP does not offer a significant response to the broader unemployment crisis 
currently being experienced by the state.  This point is underlined by the fact that in 
order to meet the MDG objective of halving unemployment in South Africa by 2014, 
approximately 3.6 – 7.7 million additional jobs will be required (Meth 2004b), 
compared to the total of 200,000 temporary jobs to be provided at any one time under 
the EPWP.” 
[McCord, 2004: p 10] 
 
Nevertheless, despite concerns about effectiveness of programmes such as EPWP, there 
is evidence of a shift in government’s emphasis which suggests a greater recognition 
that urban development could be more holistic, create more jobs, and be more 
responsive to local conditions through greater flexibility in national policy frameworks.  
The focus on employment issues in the past few years as well as a renewed government 
commitment to an urban development agenda has allowed for programmes such as the 
EPWP to begin to take root.  However, at the level of implementation there remains a 
measure of caution when it comes to authorities allocating the time and resources to 
maximise employment opportunities.   This is aggravated by inertia in some national 
programmes, where funding models or regulatory procedures do not necessarily enable 
full opportunity to be taken of leverage opportunity. 
 
The recent national policy frameworks under the Breaking New Ground Plan place 
considerably greater emphasis than was previously the case, on dealing with informal 
settlements which have persisted and in fact grown in the past decade.  There has been 
in increase in the number of projects seeking to undertake in situ (or on-site) upgrades 
of informal settlements.  In parallel there are many projects that seek to relocate people 
living in poorly located informal settlements into greenfields housing projects.  Cities 
such as eThekwini and Johannesburg have identified settlements for upgrading in situ 
or relocation.  Cape Town has responded through the large-scale urban redevelopment 
“N2 Gateway” project.  These form part of nine major pilots of combination in situ 
upgrades and relocations (to new housing schemes) under the Breaking New Ground 
commitments. 
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4.  Case studies 
The case studies give some insight into how housing can influence employment 
processes at the project level.  The first case, Cato Manor in Durban, was the subject of 
an urban development project co-funded by the government and the European Union.  
The second case is that of the People’s Housing Process in a small-scale housing 
project in Vosloorus, Ekurhuleni (near Johannesburg).   
 
4.1 CATO MANOR 
Cato Manor has been held up as a model of international best practice in urban 
reconstruction.  It also provides a useful understanding of the difficulty in using 
housing to create employment in a complex institutional environment.   
 
Cato Manor is a large area, approximately 1830 hectares, and is close to the Durban 
city centre, as Figure 3 shows.  Approximately half of Cato Manor is unsuitable for 
urban development due to flood zones, unsuitable geology or adverse topography.  By 
the early 1990s it was home to an estimated 93 000 people who had settled in the area 
through mass invasions.  Many of the people settling in Cato Manor during this period 
had fled political violence in areas on the metropolitan periphery.  Before this Cato 
Manor had been vacant since the 1950's, following apartheid forced removals of an 
estimated 150 000 people.   
 
Figure 6: Cato Manor in its Local Context  
 
In the early 1990s - as the pace of political 
reform in South Africa grew - Cato Manor 
increasingly came to be seen as an opportunity 
for a “mega” urban renewal project and an 
opportunity to test new democratic approaches 
to urban reconstruction.  According to the 
CMDA, 
“[Diverse] groups of stakeholders including 
individuals, local community organisations, 
political parties and city and provincial 
authorities came together to embrace the 
numerous re-development challenges presented 
by Cato Manor”  
 
[CMDA website, 2005] 
 
The redevelopment of Cato Manor has regional significance because of the impact it 
has had on restructuring Durban’s city form, as well as the impact it has had nationally 
as a learning area for the post-apartheid redevelopment of other inner city sites.  The 
combination of Cato Manor’s location and its historical significance presented a 
promising laboratory in which to test some of the ANC’s approaches in terms of urban 
reconstruction in general, and its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
in particular. 
 
South African housing policy stresses the need for the establishment of viable, socially 
and economically integrated communities, situated in areas allowing convenient access  
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to economic opportunities as well as to health, educational and social amenities.  The 
primary purpose of the Cato Manor Development Programme (CMDP) was to create a 
vibrant, high density, economically sustainable and ecologically balanced urban 
environment that was fully integrated into the surrounding urban fabric physically, 
institutionally, socially and economically.  The Cato Manor Development Association 
(CMDA) was established to plan and facilitate the redevelopment of Cato Manor.  The 
planning function included the preparation of projects and out-sourcing their 
implementation.  The CMDP is a complex and holistic urban redevelopment project 
with a housing component, rather than a housing project with an urban redevelopment 
component.  As the focus of this report is on employment, some of the nuances of the 
overall project are not described here.   
 
Historical context 
Figure 7: A brief history of Cato Manor 
 
Institutional Context 
The predecessor of the CMDA, the Greater Cato Manor Development Forum, was 
influential in determining the structure of the CMDA, and the development philosophy 
for the redevelopment of Cato Manor. 
 
1845  Farmed by Durban’s first mayor George Cato and subdivided into smaller farms at the turn 
of the century. 
1900-
1930 
Land hired and sold to Indian market gardeners.  First settlement of Africans on the banks of 
the Umkhumbane River 
1932  Cato Manor incorporated in to Durban Municipality.  Shack settlements declared illegal.  
Shack farming by Indian landowners. 
1949  Violence between Indians and Africans resulted in most Indians families leaving the area. 
1950  Indian landlords returned to Cato Manor, where 50000 people then lived 
1957  Cato Manor declared a temporary transit camp.  ”Townships” constructed on the periphery of 
the municipality and residents of Cato Manor forcibly removed to new housing in 
KwaMashu and Phoenix. 
1959-
1960 
Resistance to attempts to forcibly remove people to KwaMashu culminated in the death of 
nine police in the transit camp.  The authorities escalate the removals and rapidly cleared the 
entire area. 
1968  With the exception of a few scattered houses, shops, the beer hall and several Hindu temples, 
all of the building stock and infrastructure were demolished. 
1979  Remaining residents form the Cato Manor Residents Association 
Mid-
1980s 
House of Delegates – the administration set up under apartheid to deal with “Indian affairs - 
identifies land at Wiggins for housing for the Indian population. 
1992  Cato Manor Development Forum established to pool the land and to commit stakeholders to 
the redevelopment of Cato Manor. 
1993   Cato Manor Development Association established as a non profit organisation to manage the 
redevelopment of Cato Manor.  Two neighbourhoods in Cato manor, Cato Crest and Wiggins 
were invaded in the run-up to the first democratic elections.   
1995  Cato Manor designated a special presidential project.  Further land invasions occurred.  Cato 
Manor structure plan was drafted, based on the notion of the compact city, and structured by 
mixed use intensive activity corridors. 
1996  EU signed co-financing agreement.  The process of inviting and hearing land claims started. 
1997  Land claim settlement reached. 
1996-
1998 
Project is restructured with greater accountability to the municipality. 
2002  Initial EU programme ended.  The project is restructured as an Area-Based Management 
programme.  
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The CMDA was established in 1993 as a not-for-profit company, to act as an agent for 
the eThekwini Municipality (then known as the Durban City Council), the Kwa-Zulu-
Natal provincial government (then known as the Natal Provincial Administration) and 
national government.  It was politically important that CMDA be separate from any 
single state organ (Nell et al, 2003).   
 
 The development vision for Cato Manor envisaged “a vibrant, high density, balanced, 
sustainable urban environment appropriately integrated into the surrounding areas, 
offering a mixture of residential, economic, social and community opportunities, 
targeted mainly at the urban poor, and easily accessible without the need to own a car.” 
 
[CMDA website] 
 
Furthermore the vision had to be attained in a manner that was:  
“innovative, replicable, environmentally sound, non-discriminatory, had a positive 
influence on the development of the eThekwini Metropolitan Area and will generate 
models for future urban development projects.”  
[CMDA website] 
 
The intended expression of this vision was the provision of affordable housing and 
secure tenure; the development of bulk engineering and social infrastructure, the 
improvement of access; the establishment of safe and secure living and working 
environments; the provision of jobs and extensive economic opportunities; and the 
integration of Cato Manor into the eThekwini Municipality.  The CMDA targeted the 
delivery of 25 000 dwelling units and the creation of 25 000 permanent jobs. 
 
The roles which CMDA intended to serve to achieve the vision were: 
 
  To be the facilitator of development in Cato Manor 
  To ensure that development took place in an integrated manner 
  To identify and prepare projects for implementation by public, private and 
community agencies.   
  To act as a developer of ‘last resort’. 
 
The scale of the project required a commitment of R 514 million.  Funders included the 
South African Government, the EU, the Provincial Housing Department, the eThekwini 
Municipality.  Unites States Agency for International Development and the Swedish 
International Development Agency, the Independent Development Trust and the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa who supported earlier phases of the project. 
 
A partnership approach was identified as a key success factor.  As a result, relationships 
with funders grew beyond conventional funder-recipient relationship.  Strong ties were 
also established with a range of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community 
Based Organisations (CBOs) and Development Committees as well as with universities 
and technikons.  Where possible these institutions were encouraged to play a role in 
implementation.  The delivery of essential services in Cato Manor has proceeded 
through joint partnerships with local, provincial and national government departments 
such as police, welfare, housing, education and health.   
 
One of the key features of the project’s funding was the EU’s condition that there be 
co-financing from other funders.  In particular commitments were required from the  
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Department of Housing’s subsidy scheme, and from local government to take 
operational responsibility for social facilities and engineering infrastructure.  Lack of 
contracted commitments in either of these two cases would jeopardise the EU funds 
 
The EU funding contract ended at the end of 2003.  CMDA was then incorporated into 
the eThekwini Metro.  CMDA is now one of several geographically discrete 
programmes of targeted, integrated development interventions referred to as the Area 
Based Management Programmes.  The inspiration for this the Area Based Management 
Programmes was Cato Manor.  The Area Based Management Programmes are co-
funded by the EU.  The Cato Manor Area Based Management took over many of the 
CMDA’s roles and functions, guided in part by the independent Final Evaluation of the 
CMDP. 
 
The Evolution of the CMDP 
The overall development process in Cato Manor was envisaged as comprising three 
broad overlapping stages.   
 
  Phase I: Project Preparation - Securing the fundamentals for development (1994-
1997) 
The aim of this initial three-year phase was to position the CMDP for intensive 
delivery and implementation.  Conditions for creating an environment conducive to 
large-scale delivery were incrementally put in place during this time:  
 
o  Development plans and policies were put in place, in particular spatial plan 
comprising two activity corridors, a central node and a range of residential 
precincts.; 
o  Technical and social support requirements were identified and secured; 
o  Land assembly (including the consolidation of title) took place; 
o  Statutory and legal constraints to development were cleared; 
o  Land invasions were successfully halted;  
o  The maintenance of law and order was improved; and 
o  Commitments of major public investment were secured and directed into 
projects. 
 
In addition, sound working relations amongst key partners were established, roles 
clarified, and human resources recruited to drive the development initiatives 
forward.   
 
A major challenge was to deal with the claims for land restitution of land made by 
people and communities who had been forcibly removed.  Over 5 700 of such land 
claims were tabled to the Land Claims Commission.  The volume of land claims 
threatened to bring the broader development process to a complete halt.  Te CMDP 
successfully petitioned the Land Claims Court to not restore land to claimants but to 
use other forms of redress such as alternative land or financial compensation.   
 
  Phase II: Delivery at scale (1997-2002) 
Large-scale delivery began in 1997 and the massive public investment in the area 
became evident in the rapid transformation of Cato Manor’s physical landscape.   
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Significant progress with was made to eliminate backlogs in housing, and 
engineering and social infrastructure.   
A Mid-Term Review was undertaken in 2000 by independent consultants.  The 
review that the CMDP had been highly successful in meeting its initial objectives.   
 
  Phase III: Private investment and capital formation (2002 and beyond) 
The third phase of the CMDP focussed on:  
 
o  Social development 
o  Local economic development 
o  Escalation of private sector investment 
o  Completion of the housing programme 
o  Assessing the replicability of CMDP. 
 
A Research and Documentation Project was started in March 2002 to assess the 
replicability of the CMDP and to disseminate the CMDP experiences in dealing 
with urban development problems, managing complex, large-scale development 
projects, and maintaining progress within the continuously shifting political and 
institutional environment. 
 
Bulk infrastructure program 
This program aimed to develop the larger-order infrastructure that would be required 
before the local infrastructure required for precincts could be constructed.  The bulk 
infrastructure components include main roads, bulk sewers, bulk water supply, 
electricity, and bulk stormwater disposal.  Wherever possible, maximum use was made 
of the little bulk infrastructure that had escaped demolition.  Much of the bulk 
infrastructure was constructed by labour-based methods.   
 
A design principle of the main roads was that they had to provide high levels of 
mobility and accessibility within Cato Manor and to connect Cato Manor to the 
metropolitan area.  The new main roads - approximately 25 km of arterial, bus, and 
mini-bus routes - serve as a quick route from one side of the city to the other.   
 
Housing and related (local) infrastructure 
  Aims of the housing program 
 
Within the integrated urban reconstruction concept, it was intended that the housing 
programme would provide a range of housing types, be affordable, achieve 
economies of scale, and create a liveable environment.  Housing delivery was 
intended to stimulate economic multipliers, particularly job creation and economic 
development.  In the South African context, housing encompasses the construction 
of houses as well as the installation of local roads, sanitation, and water supply 
systems.  As with bulk infrastructure, housing (and related infrastructure) 
programme had potential for employment creations 
 
The Cato Manor housing programme targeted the delivery of 25 000 housing units 
to accommodate up to 150 000 people.  The housing program tried provide shelter 
and related infrastructure, as well as to address some of the pressing social and 
economic needs of the populace.by:    
26 
o  Maximising the housing opportunities on the available land;  
o  Providing a range of housing types;  
o  Ensuring that the housing stock be affordable to low and middle income earners; 
and  
o  Avoiding the creation of monotonous and unsustainable residential 
environments.   
 
The supply of electricity and water reticulation to dwellings and the provision of a 
water-borne sewage is integral to the housing programme in Cato Manor.  The 
budget constraints of the subsidy system did not allow for the high standards of 
local infrastructure.  Top-up funding to improve the standards of local infrastructure 
was provided by the municipality.   
 
It was anticipated that the houses would be constructed by the private, not-for-
profit, and community sectors, and that CMDA would only act as developer of last 
resort.  The gradual withdrawal of large, private sector companies from the low-
income housing sector in the late 1990s forced the CMDA to take on a more direct 
role.  The withdrawal of the private sector does not appear to have been formally 
analysed.  Anecdotal evidence suggest that the withdrawal arose from the declining 
profitability of subsidy-funded housing projects (prompted by failure of the housing 
subsidy quantum to match construction-linked inflation, sluggish release of progress 
payments, and the risks associated with subsidy-funded housing projects), and the 
opening up of other opportunities for the private sector. 
 
  Results and methods of the housing program 
 
Four broad housing project types were undertaken
6:  
o  Informal Settlement Upgrading Projects;  
o  Greenfields Incremental Projects;  
o  Social Housing; and  
o  Credit-Linked Housing.   
 
There are six informal settlements in Cato Manor, housing approximately 7 500 
households.  Most of these settlements reach residential densities of over 90 shacks 
per hectare and many are situated on unstable land.  Many shacks house multiple 
households.  The CMDA focused much of its housing capacity on these 
settlements.   
 
Three of the settlements have been substantially upgraded, by the construction of 
local access roads and footpaths, local water supply and sanitation, and the 
construction of houses.  For the most part, local infrastructure was planned to 
minimise the need to relocate households.  Where it was unavoidable, households 
in the path of infrastructure were relocated to nearby greenfields projects.  Choices 
on house type were discussed with small groups of 50 to 100 households at a time, 
and upgrading took place on a 'block by block' basis.   
 
                                                 
6 Appendix 1 contains a summary of the number of housing units delivered by the CMDP. 
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Several housing and related infrastructure projects were developed on vacant land 
(so-called “Greenfields projects”).  The approach taken was to develop the projects 
within the available subsidy budget.  The rationale of this was that households 
could access shelter without any burden of debt, and that home-owners would 
extend or improve the houses when they could afford it.  This “incremental 
housing” approach appears to have succeeded.  Some of the older greenfields 
projects show high levels of consolidation, with almost every house having been 
extended.  The result of extensions has been augmented population density (a 
benefit at city-scale) and rental income through the letting of part of the house (a 
benefit for home-owners).   
 
A pilot social housing project consisting of 320 units, the Shayamoya Project, was 
undertaken to test community responses to rental tenure and to multi-storey, higher 
density accommodation.  This model offers limited scope for the very poor to 
access housing.   
 
Credit-linked housing is aimed at families who can afford loan finance.  Three 
such projects were developed.  In order to make houses affordable to lower income 
households that would otherwise be unable to access bond housing CMDA 
designed loan packages, secured bulk finance, and took on the role of loan 
originator. 
 
  Challenges for the housing program 
The highly charged social and political environment in Cato Manor had a direct 
impact on the CMDA's ability to proceed with housing programmes.  Delivery was 
also hampered by the emergence of powerful “shack lords” who had an economic 
interest in maintaining the status quo in informal areas.   
 
An exodus of skilled professionals from KwaZulu-Nasal’s low-income housing 
industry - because of the high risks and relatively low returns of low-cost housing - 
led to the CMDA developing its own housing design and delivery capacity.  It did 
so by establishing and mentoring a network of local emerging contractors to build 
houses and related infrastructure.   
 
The difficult topography and complex geo-technical conditions that prevail across 
much of the development area have further challenges.   
 
Implicit in the holistic development approach was to avoid Cato Manor becoming a 
dormitory suburb.  The CMDP has demonstrated that it is possible to transform 
housing projects into liveable environments, and that after the construction of the 
initial house, households make substantial investments of own resources into 
improvements.  The involvement of communities from the outset seems to lead to 
home-owners identifying strongly with the process of housing and the products of 
housing.   
 
  Challenges to employment-intensive approaches 
Conditions of funding contracts did not in many cases specifically require 
employment intensive methods in housing construction.  Political pressure for rapid 
delivery may also have had a role in lessening focus on employment-intensity. 
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In the first years of the housing subsidy scheme (ca.  1994 to 1999), no provision 
was made for increasing the subsidies to account for inflation.  Annual increases to 
the subsidy began in ca.  2000.  For the first few years thereafter (up to ca.  2003), 
the annual increases were relatively small (though since then annual increases have 
exceeded inflation quite considerably).  Some of the effects of no- or low-increases 
from 1994 to 2003 seem to have been to: 
 
o  Make it undesirable for project planners and implementers to do anything that 
would postpone the end-date of projects (like using slower labour-based 
methods, or deep community consultation) 
o  Limit or exclude the scope for value-adds (like technical skills training, or 
encouraging the creation of construction SMEs) 
o  Cut margins to the extent that established private sector firms were no longer 
prepared to consider employment-intensive or sub-contracting protocols. 
o  Cut margins to the extent that most established private sector firms and 
consultants sought projects in other fields altogether.   
 
Despite these constraints, CMDA was able to achieve results in employment 
creation and skills training. 
 
Social Infrastructure 
A full range of social facilities, (including schools, libraries, clinics, community halls, 
religious sites, urban parks and sports fields), was planned and built.  The facilities are 
located optimally in relation to housing projects, transport routes, and economic 
opportunities.  The development of social facilities was a major focus when large-scale 
delivery got underway in 1997. 
 
Employment  
  Context 
Employment levels in Cato Manor are relatively high, probably as a result of its 
close proximity to the inner city, the harbour and the South Durban Industrial Basin.  
According to the 1996 census (augmented by surveys undertaken by the CMDA), 
the total level of unemployment among the economically active population in Cato 
Manor was 29%.  Among men this rate was slightly lower at 26% and among 
women slightly higher at 32%. 
 
By economic sector, the main source of income was retail (65% of employment) 
followed by services (18% of employment).  Construction does not appear to make 
a significant contribution to employment in Cato Manor.  Proposals for a new and 
used building materials market may however change this.   
 
  Skills Development 
The CMDA implemented training programmes to help local people access 
economic opportunities, to gain employment, and to start businesses.  Initiatives to 
strengthen existing community organisations and to train people in basic life skills 
for urban living also form part of this programme. 
 
The Basic Business Management training project assisted emerging entrepreneurs to 
establish, operate and manage their business.  It benefited 230 small business  
29 
owners.  Courses utilised material developed by the ILO, marketing and 
management training, and an analysis of each entrepreneur’s business.  The training 
was later extended to entrepreneurs in the Bellair Market, the Bellair Centre, 
economic hives and container parks.   
 
The Multi-Skilling programme, aimed at equipping emerging building contractors 
with technical, business and sub-contracting skills benefited 187 people.  Emerging 
contractors were linked to construction projects through appointment as labour-only 
sub-contractors, or as joint venture partners.   
 
The Home Ownership Education Project was designed to help first-time 
homeowners deal with the challenges of home ownership, and covered issues such 
as rates, services, maintenance and home extensions.  It attempted to raise 
community awareness around environmental, consumer and gender issues, as well 
as covering the challenges of human settlement development.  The Seliyabuya Co-
operative, a team of trainers sourced from Cato Manor residents implemented the 
project.  The awareness project reached 4 500 household heads.  
 
  Market linkages 
Employment creation is a part of the Cato Manor vision
7.  The CMDA recognised 
the opportunity to provide both housing and jobs.  Local labour was recruited where 
feasible and where political pressure for rapid delivery allowed. 
 
CMDA fostered linkages between local residents and both local and non-local 
markets.  An initiative to establish savings clubs and co-operatives arose out of the 
Home Ownership Education Project.  Existing savings clubs were drawn into this 
poverty alleviation initiative and new clubs established.  Clubs were assisted with 
organisational development, management and operation.  Fifty savings clubs (also 
called ‘pre-co-operatives’) and five co-operatives (legal entities that operate as 
businesses) now pursue different ventures, including locally produced household 
detergents, fresh garden produce, cleaning, recycling, crafts and block making.   
 
The Job Opportunities Bureau database held details of 5,000 local small contractors 
and individuals seeking employment.  1,347 placements were made from this 
database both within Cato Manor and further a field.   
 
Spin-offs of social and infrastructure projects in Cato Manor included the 
employment of local residents and local enterprises.  Targeted procurement policies, 
developed by the South African government were implemented by the CMDA 
together with the Labour Forum, a sub-structure of the Cato Manor Community 
Organisation.  In their bids, contractors had to indicate the local content percentage 
of the project value (i.e. what value would accrue to local residents and local 
enterprises).  The CMDA and the Labour Forum together monitored the observance 
by non-local contractors of the local content conditions. 
 
The development of housing in Cato Manor had to strike a balance between rapid 
delivery and maximising the use of local based labour.  It was found that labour 
intensive approaches were most effective when the concept was introduced in the 
                                                 
7 “Policy Framework for Cato Manor”, ca.  1995  
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project preparation stage.  Local labour and expertise was used extensively for the 
construction of local infrastructure, for the construction of top structures, and has 
been used in ongoing maintenance and enhancement activities.  The labour 
components of each contract were broken down into tasks and allocated to labour 
teams.  Remuneration was based on the successful completion of tasks. 
 
The construction of bulk and local infrastructure were ideal opportunities for job 
creation.  Initially, the municipality’s tender process was used as a basis for 
contracts, and clauses were included in contracts with respect to the sourcing of 
local labour for unskilled and semi-skilled activities.  One of these clauses required 
that at least 80% of the labour used for the project be drawn from the local area.  A 
further clause required the contractor to engage a community liaison officer whose 
responsibilities included identifying skills in the local community.   
 
The local labour requirements in the infrastructure contracts included a gender 
component, although the contractor and the local community often initially resisted 
this.  Nonetheless, once this resistance was overcome, teams of women were found 
to be more efficient in completing the tasks allocated to them than all male teams.  
Use of local labour was monitored by means of reporting on site minutes. 
 
The CMDA was also able to increase the impact of the use of labour intensive 
techniques by requiring a minimum wage slightly higher than the legal requirement.  
A typical contract for local infrastructure resulted in the servicing of 250 to 500 sites 
over 4 to 8 months.  Although the employment created was temporary in nature, 
sufficient skills development took place to make it possible for future employment 
opportunities to be taken up by those who had been trained. 
 
The construction of top structures requires a more skilled labour force than the 
construction of infrastructure.  Initially local contractors were subcontracted through 
large construction companies who held the main contract with the Department of 
Housing.  In many cases, the local sub-contractors operated as little more than 
labour brokers.   
 
As mentioned previously, between 1998 and 2000, many of the larger construction 
companies pulled out of the low-income housing sector, citing diminishing returns 
and increasing risk.  As a result the CMDA increasingly played the developer role 
on housing projects.  Groups of local artisans who were unable to find work began 
to present themselves as contractors.  These groups consisted of people with all the 
necessary skills to construct a house (electrician, plumber, bricklayer, roofer etc) 
with one artisan taking the lead role and the responsibility for delivery of the house.  
This lead person was usually selected on their ability to understand and manage the 
contract.   
 
Initially a contractor would be given one house to construct.  If this was completed 
satisfactorily then they would be given a contract for the construction of two houses.  
On successful completion of this contract, a contract for the construction of five 
houses was then awarded.  Approximately 30 groups were initially given contracts, 
and through a process of performance-based selection, this number was reduced.   
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Successful local contractors were used on other housing projects throughout Cato 
Manor.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the same contractors are now being used 
by residents to improve and extend their properties.  As residents discovered the 
market for sub-letting rooms, the initial structures have been systematically 
expanded.  It is estimated that 60% of households extended their structure within 
two years of occupation. 
 
While it was recognised that capacity building and the use of local resources was 
important, delivery pressure and EU procurement rules precluding affirmative 
appointments meant that resources external to Cato Manor had to be used.   
However, the approach taken was to require external consultants and contractors to 
build the capacity of local residents and local businesses.   
 
In 1993/1994 a Consultants Appointment Review Panel (CARP) was set up to deal 
with selection of consultants as well as broader issues of transformation in particular 
the following objectives: 
o  Transformation of the allocation of job opportunities to achieve an equitable 
balance of race, gender and other groups or organisations historically excluded 
from the development process. 
o  Expanding the pool of competent black consultants, technicians and 
entrepreneurs as well as building local expertise in urban development. 
o  Re-training professionals, particularly in the public sector. 
o  Engendering a wider civic accountability. 
 
LED was not implemented as a line function but was integrated into other 
programmes.  This created problems when the Cato Manor Area Based Management 
took over, in that LED had no natural “home” within municipal structures.  Specific 
construction-related projects include the uMkumbane Block Making Co-operative 
and the building material manufacture project. 
 
  Results of employment programmes 
8 759 temporary jobs were created by the programmes run under the CMDP.  1% of 
these jobs became permanent, and all of these were created by the LED programme 
(which also generated the most number of temporary employment opportunities).  
The housing programme resulted in 2,610 temporary jobs.   
 
The skills development component of the Housing and Social Facilities programme 
was particularly successful with 100% of temporary employees receiving some level 
of skills transfer.   
Figure 8: Skills Development and temporary employment in the CMDP 
People with skills* 
People with temporary 
employment**   Activity 
No. 
% of resident 
pop.  No. 
% of resident 
pop. 
LED  2973  3.2%  3644  3.9% 
Housing  2610  2.8%  2610  2.8% 
Infrastructure  0  0.0%  1136  1.2% 
Social Facilities  1369  1.5%  1369  1.5% 
Total  6952  7.5%  8759  9.4% 
* People with skills refers to those trained in the CMDA projects 
** People with temporary employment refers to the temporary jobs yielded in the project  
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Summary of employment creation and skills training methods used in Cato Manor 
Figure 9: Summary of employment creation and skills training methods used in Cato Manor 
Assessment 
factor 
Infrastructure  Top-structures  Post-completion 
Use of technology 
Machinery and labour 
intensive methods  
both used 
Appropriate choice of 
labour intensive 
technologies 
Appropriate choice of 
labour intensive 
technologies for 
infrastructure 
maintenance, and 
home improvements 
Procurement of 
unskilled and semi-
skilled labour 
80% local labour 
Community liaison 
officers recruited from 
communities 
On site training and 
skills transfer 
Sourced locally 
Indications are that 
local people have 
been procured for 
home improvements. 
Procurement of 
artisans, 
supervisors and 
professionals 
From outside the 
area 
Artisans sourced 
locally. 
Mentors to emerging 
contractors sourced 
from outside. 
Indications are that 
the more efficient of 
the emerging 
contractors are being 
engaged by have 
been procured for 
home improvements. 
Materials 
procurement 
Mostly from outside 
the area 
Mostly from outside 
the area 
Mostly from outside 
the area  (presumed) 
Equipment 
procurement 
From outside the 
area 
From outside the 
area 
From outside the 
area (presumed) 
Skills development   Some basic skills 
transferred 
Emerging contractors 
trained and mentored  No information. 
Investments  of 
resources by 
project 
beneficiaries 
Extremely unlikely 
that private 
households would 
have invested into 
public projects 
Unlikely to have 
occurred because of 
the formality of the 
contractor-led 
delivery model 
Significant 
investments by 
home-owners in  
home extensions and 
improvements 
Involvement of 
women 
Part of the 80% local 
labour requirement.  
Usually strongly 
resisted by 
contractors. 
Part of the 80% local 
labour requirement.  
Usually strongly 
resisted by 
contractors. 
No information 
Working conditions  Minimum wage set 
higher than legislative 
requirements.  
Complied with 
minimum health and 
safety requirements 
as set out in 
legislation 
Minimum wage set 
higher than legislative 
requirements.  
Complied with 
minimum health and 
safety requirements 
as set out in 
legislation 
Home extensions 
unlikely to follow 
legislated guidelines 
 
Commentary on employment aspects in Cato Manor 
The following conclusions reflect a project, which despite some shortcomings has, had 
impact in terms of scale and scope: 
 
  The change from an agency representing all three spheres of government to an 
implementing agent located within the municipality presented an opportunity to 
make use of more employment intensive methods, particularly in light of the 
fact that the housing programme is far from complete.    
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  The shift in emphasis from infrastructure, housing and public buildings to 
economic, human and social development provided further opportunities for job 
creation.   
 
  Labour-based construction was often viewed as a “nice-to-have” when balanced 
against the political pressures to deliver housing and  infrastructure projects.  
This limited the extent to which these approaches could be mainstreamed into 
the overall programme.  Where it was possible, CMDA used labour intensive 
approaches and made significant impacts. 
 
  The main performance indicators of the housing projects were the quality of the 
house and the number of houses built.  Job creation was not a key performance 
indicator.  
 
  LED in Cato Manor focussed on extending credit, and availing information and 
marketing assistance and enterprise development activities.  There potential 
alignment between LED interventions and housing-related processes was not 
always exploited. 
 
  While it has been suggested that better value for money may have been 
achieved through greater use of aided self-help approach, particularly where 
such a large proportion of residents are unemployed, the choice of delivery 
system was also largely determined by community attitudes: “It appears that 
residents, despite being given access to training, materials and other support, 
were not in favour of this [owner-builder] approach and chose to employ a 
building contractor” (Boaden, 2004, pg 239). Hence a considerable focus of 
support work by the CMDA was focused on contractor development. 
 
  That the creation of permanent employment remains a major challenge as is 
highlighted by the absence of permanent employment created by the Housing, 
Infrastructure and Social Facilities Programs. 
 
4.2. VOSLOORUS PEOPLE’S HOUSING PROCESS PROJECT 
This case study examines a housing project in Vosloorus that was implemented via the 
People’s Housing Process (PHP).  Vosloorus lies to the east of Johannesburg in the 
Ekurhuleni Metro,  Gauteng province.  The study contextualises the PHP and then 
describes the specific experience in the Vosloorus case, as perceived by one of the 
development agencies involved in the project, Planact, an NGO.  A limitation of this 
case study is that another development agency that had a significant involvement in the 
project, namely the Ekurhuleni Metro – the local authority, was not extensively 
consulted in the course of the study of the Vosloorus case. 
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The policy context for the Peoples Housing Process (PHP) 
A summarised version of this section appears in 3.1. Urban development & housing. 
 
The establishment of partnerships, the transfer of skills, community empowerment and 
a process that is people-driven were some of the key principles underlying this policy.  
The policy was introduced in 1998. 
 
The PHP “aims to support households who wish to enhance their subsidies by building 
or organising the building of their homes themselves. The process assists such 
households to access:   
o  “Housing subsidies   
o  “Technical, financial, logistical and administrative support regarding the building of 
their homes, on a basis that is sustainable and affordable. Experience has proved 
that if beneficiaries are given the chance either to build houses themselves or to 
organise the building of houses themselves, they can build better houses for less 
money.  
 
“The People’s Housing Process route towards accessing subsidies provides a creative 
alternative to the mechanisms described in the previous chapters because beneficiaries 
can:   
o  “save on labour costs by doing some of the building work themselves or by getting 
their neighbours, friends and families or other persons to help them;   
o  “avoid having to pay a profit element to developers if they build houses themselves 
or organise for those houses to be built;   
o  “optimise their decisions by using opportunities for trade offs.   
 
“Technical assistance and support in this process is, however, critical.  Consequently, a 
crucial imperative of the People’s Housing Process approach is the requirement to 
establish a Support Organisation. This organisation spearheads the technical support 
process”  as well as the financial and project management processes. 
 
[Housing Code Part 3 Chapter 8: Housing Subsidy Scheme / People’s Housing Process] 
  
Implementation guidelines for the PHP process were published by the National 
Department of Housing in May 1998, more or less concurrently with the introduction of 
the policy. 
 
PHP funding 
The PHP is a delivery mechanism (as opposed to a type of subsidy).  With some minor 
modifications, it utilises the same housing subsidy types (Greenfields, Consolidation, 
Institutional et al) that are available for delivery of housing stock via more conventional 
mechanisms.  There is provision for additional funding at R 800 per beneficiary for 
organisational, technical and administrative support This is channelled via Support 
Organisations under the funding instrument “Establishment Grant”. 
 
Delivery of housing stock nationally via PHP 
Statistics on delivery (houses built or under construction) via the PHP mechanism could 
not be readily located during the research period.  An alternative indicator of scale of 
the use of the PHP mechanism is the number of subsidy approvals.  By March 2004, 
subsidies approved for delivery via PHP totalled 272 165 (since the inception of the  
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PHP mechanism in 1998).  This represented 11.17% of all of the 2 436 404 housing 
subsidies approved from 1994 to 2004.   
 
It is presently unclear if the proportion of subsidies to be delivered via PHP will remain 
at the present 11% level.  There does not appear to be an express strategy at a national 
level as the relative emphasis to be placed on the PHP mechanism.  The implication 
appears to be that the various Provincial Housing Departments and-or municipalities 
will individually set their own particular approach as to the relative weight on PHP 
compared to other delivery mechanisms.  Systematic research was not however 
undertaken to determine each province’s or selected municipalities’ PHP intentions.   
 
One means of expression of emphasis on PHP is the use of target quotas.  The Gauteng 
and North-West Provincial Departments of Housing (and there may be others) have 
expressed their intentions to set aside a percentage of their total number of subsidies for 
delivery via PHP.   While other provinces have not necessarily set target quotas, this 
would not necessarily imply a lack of emphasis on PHP delivery.   
 
Institutional support nationally 
The Peoples Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT) was established in June 1997.  It was 
mandated to drive the implementation of a comprehensive capacity building 
programme in support of the PHP delivery mechanism. The authors of this report 
surmise that, to some extent the existence of the PHPT may have assisted in making the 
PHP process more visible.  The presence of the PHP is also likely to have been a factor 
in the number of subsidies applied for via the PHP mechanism.  It appears likely that 
the shrinkage of the PHPT’s staff complement to three persons during the 2004 fiscal 
year
8 will result in diminished visibility of the PHP mechanism, and may therefore also 
affect the number of subsidy applications made under the PHP mechanism. 
 
Institutional support in Gauteng 
The Gauteng Department of Housing has prioritised PHP housing projects as a delivery 
strategy to the extent that they have established a PHP directorate.  This directorate has 
set targets to establish 60 housing support centres and construct 60 000 houses in three 
years.  The province appears to be advocating a PHP model in which construction 
‘brigades’ are established to undertake the construction of the houses using labour from 
the subsidy beneficiary community.  Furthermore the province has insisted that the 
houses be a minimum of 36m² in size and that they should have at least two bedrooms. 
 
The Gauteng Province had also initially decided to implement PHP by uniformly 
designating the local authority as the Support Organisation.  The province is now trying 
to source other support organisations, and to create a new institution to capacitate local 
authorities.  It was on this basis that the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council brought in 
Planact as the Secondary Support Organisation in the Vosloorus project. 
 
Project pre-history 
Vosloorus Ext 28 is an informal settlement with 1 350 serviced sites and is about 25km 
from the CBD of Boksburg.  The project was initiated in 1987 when South African 
National Civics Organisation assisted the community to identify land.  Land was 
                                                 
8 NDOH Annual report March 2004  
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obtained and in 1990 infrastructure was installed through the Independent Development 
Trust’s Capital Subsidy Scheme.  Since then, lighting, tarred roads and facilities such as 
clinics were incrementally constructed in the area.  Over time a strong community 
social network has developed through Block and Area committees, and more recently 
Ward committees.   
 
Identities of the Support Organisation, the Account Administrator, and the 
Secondary Support Organisation 
The Ekurhuleni Metro was the Support Organisation, and the Account Administrator, 
and its responsibilities were to assume overall contractual responsibility for the project 
implementation and to administer project finances.  In mid-2000 the Ekurhuleni Metro 
appointed Planact as the Secondary Support Organisation, in order to partner the 
Support Organisation and the Vosloorus community in the implementation of the 
project.  Planact is an NGO that since the 1980s has been involved in community-
centred development, and a critical skill it brought to the project was the ability to serve 
as an interface between community and project. 
 
The following progress was identified since the formation of the Metro-Planact 
partnership: 
 
  The Steering/Housing Committee established its legitimacy within the community 
and undertook a needs assessment to determine the community’s priorities; 
 
  Newly elected Steering/Housing committee members were trained in leadership; 
finance; project management, and; the roles of all actors in the process; 
 
  Community mobilisation workshops were conducted; 
 
  The local municipality strengthened its support to the project; 
 
  Proposals were prepared and then presented to secure the Gauteng Province’s 
commitment of Housing Subsidies, Facilitation Grants and Establishment Grants.  
This  took approximately 8 months at a cost of approximately R 50 000 to Planact, 
of which R 36 000.00 was recovered from the Facilitation Grant  The value of 
Housing Subsidies awarded to the project  in 2001 was R 2 125 000 (at R 8 500.00 
per top structure); 
 
  Project Beneficiaries were identified, and Subsidy Forms (i.e. individual 
applications) prepared and presented.  A first batch of 300 subsidy applications 
were submitted by June 2002, and the 250 of these were approved by province in 
September 2002; 
 
  The coordination of the project team was improved.  The project team consisted of 
the Vosloorus Steering Committee (VSC) made up of 11 members, Planact 2 
members, and Ekurhuleni Metro (2 officials) and the Gauteng Department of 
Housing officials (2 officials).  The project team was convened in July 2002.  The 
VSC met weekly with Planact prior to the project team meetings to deal with 
internal issues, ongoing capacity-building and to prepare for the project team 
meetings.   
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  Management agreements were signed whereby  the Council, as account 
administrator, provided R 50 000.00 as working capital so that  Planact could pay 
emerging contractors and itself receive a materials handling fee.  The Council and 
province provided all the technical professional assistance free of charge, in the 
persons of a planner, engineer and building inspector; 
 
  Capacity was enhanced for the construction process.  Firstly a capacity assessment 
of the community was undertaken by Planact, and then a plan for skills 
development was made.  The project team decided that the beneficiaries or other 
local labourers should work in labour teams under the supervision of emerging 
contractors from the community.  Proposals were called for from local emerging 
contractors.  26 emerging contractors applied.  The candidate contractors were 
introduced to the community, and 16 candidates were short-listed.  After an 
assessment, using references and interviews, ten candidates were selected.  These 
ten undertook Recognition of Prior Learning tests, paid for by the Department of 
Labour.  All passed the tests and got certification.  Each of these contractors then 
had to employ ten labourers.  At Planact’s insistence the project team made a 
commitment that 30% of labourers be women.    Each team of ten labourers were 
made up of 4 artisans or semi-skilled labourers and six unskilled labourers.  The 
100 labourers were then offered building skills training in July 2002 at a cost of R 
500 000.00 donated by the Department of Labour, in the fields of carpentry, 
bricklaying, glazing, wiring, and painting.  The longest training duration was 45 
days for the brick layers.  Ninety-eight people completed the training. How much 
and when to pay for the labour costs was agreed between the project committee and 
the project labour-force.  This also allowed for the labour portion of the budget to 
be finalised and deadlines to be set; 
 
  The system for the payment of labour was developed. The labour budget for each 
completed house was R 2 434 (excluding project-level management costs).  This 
was broken down as follows: 
 
o  R 540      Emerging Contractor / Construction Manager 
o  R 560      Bricklayer  
o  R 144      Unskilled labourers for foundation and slab 
o  R 600      Unskilled  labourers for the walls and roof 
o  R 250      Carpenter  
o  R 300      Glazier 
o  R  40    Draughtsperson 
 
  Due to the dolomitic conditions that occur on the site, special foundations had to be 
constructed in accordance with a design by a structural engineer.  Initially an 
emerging contractor was identified to construct the foundations, but had to pull out 
as he could not finance the construction up-front and the Council refused to provide 
bridging finance.  He was replaced by a more established contractor (who had been 
appointed via a separate process as the material supplier for the project).  Work on 
the foundations began in November 2002.  The foundations contractor was paid R 3 
300.00 per 36m² foundation (including materials).  He  was contractually obliged to 
utilise local labour.  The contractor established four labour teams and appointed 12 
local labourers per team, to hand-mix the concrete.  He paid each labourer R 12 per 
foundation.    
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  The Council charged the project R 30 per house for the scrutiny and approval of 
house plans. 
  The system for the payment of management costs was developed.  The housing 
support centre  employed 4 people: 1 technical person with building experience (a 
past lecturer at APEX and with building qualifications); 1 community liaison officer 
and 2 administrators.  Each of these were paid a fee per completed house.  The 
management costs paid out by Planact per completed houses was R 260, broken 
down as follows:  
 
o  R 80  Technical Person 
o  R 60  Community Liaison Officer 
o  R 120  Administrators  
 
In addition to these direct management costs, the five Steering Committee 
members from the community were paid R20 per completed house. They were paid 
in clusters of 100 houses.  Planact were paid a 5% materials handling fee of the 
material cost of each top-structure and 5% of each foundation.  All of these 
management costs plus equipment and other running costs were paid from the 
Establishment Grants. 
 
  Project beneficiaries were consulted on house options.  Choice was limited because 
of the local authority standards.  The VSC, in consultation with the community, 
decided on a basic square house.  Beneficiaries decided on where to position their 
homes on their own sites. 
 
  Procurement decisions were made together with the community.  Candidate 
material suppliers were identified, but only one was ultimately selected by the 
project team due to cost considerations.   
 
  The Housing Support Centre (HSC) was established in November 2002, when the 
Ekurhuleni Metro donated a building.  This permitted the bulk of the Establishment 
Grants (at R 570 per beneficiary) to be used for staffing and equipment.   
 
  Since the start of the project in 2001, some 530 beneficiaries have been trained in 
construction skills.  Some of those originally trained dropped out of the process due 
to other commitments or because they expected higher pay for the work. 
 
Phase I of house construction 
Construction of the first phase of 250 houses began in January 2003.  The HSC 
foreman decided which house contractor would work on which house and in what site-
order the construction would take place.  The HSC foreman also liaised with 
beneficiaries on construction issues.  Planact and the HSC foreman together monitored 
building progress to ensure that standards were met.  A standard specification 
inspection form was filled in for each house to check quality of construction 
 
Building inspectors from the Ekurhuleni Metro and the Gauteng DoH inspected 
construction once the houses were completed, and where they were satisfied, they 
issued ‘fit to occupy’ certificates.   
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The project team met weekly to monitor progress.  The 250 houses were completed by 
September 2003.  After this  the contracts with the materials supplier / foundations 
contractor  were terminated due to poor performance on the supply of materials and the 
bad quality of the foundations. 
 
Building materials used in Phase one included: 
o  Bricks, building sand and cement 
o  Steel window and door frames 
o  Steel doors and locks 
o  Concrete lintels, concrete window sills (exterior), and concrete air bricks 
o  Corrugated iron and SA pine rafters 
 
Phase II of house construction 
Phase II comprised another 250 units.  Construction began in October 2003 and was 
completed by about May 2005, a 19-month period – roughly twice as long as the 
construction period for Phase I.  Planact cited two main causes for this: 
o  Difficulties in procuring  reliable material suppliers 
o  Delays by the province in processing the subsidy application forms.   
 
Eight materials suppliers were tried over a period of a year before a reliable one was 
found.  The seven materials suppliers who fell out all complained about the small profit 
margins.  
 
A new foundations contractor was appointed, Instead of hand-mixed concrete, pre-mix 
concrete was used in the foundations.  This reduced the four foundation labour teams 
from 12 to six workers each.   
 
 To enable them to oversee the building process, technical workshops were held with 20 
beneficiaries at a time to train them on basic building aspects such as mortar mixes, bill 
of quantities per house etc... This training proved highly successful and enjoyed high 
levels of participation by the beneficiaries.  Due to payment delays Planact pre-financed 
the beneficiaries’ training project by R100 000.    
 
This phase offered more choice in terms of house design.   
 
Phase III of house construction 
Phase III comprised another 250 units.  Construction  began in October 2005.  As at 
December 2005, 70 foundations were complete and work was in progress on 13 houses.  
A change in the housing type resulted in the Phase II houses having four rooms - more 
rooms than the Phase I houses, although the house size remained the same at 36m².   
 
The original number of ten house contractors fell to six (three of whom are woman 
from the previous phases, and who reportedly have proven to be the best contractors).  
Another technical skills training project was completed, this time focused on the youth.  
Another 112 local community members were trained in building skills, and have been 
awarded Certificates of Competence from the Santhobisa Training Provider.  This 
technical skills training project was financed by the Department of Labour at a cost of 
R 600 000.  .  Of the 112 participants, 80% are younger than 35, and 80% were women.   
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All of the trainees were assigned to one or other of the 6 contracted teams.  As trainees 
they were paid R50 per house.   
 
In this phase local materials suppliers were procured, and typically each local supplier 
was paired with a more well-established outside suppliers to ensure  reliability of 
delivery and quantity.  Each local supplier was procured to supply 10 houses at a time.  
Monitoring and Evaluation was undertaken by Planact through a series of interviews 
with beneficiaries and other stakeholders to help document and develop the case study. 
 
Planact are currently withdrawing from the housing aspect of the Vosloorus project in 
order to focus on the farming co-operative set up in the HSC complex.  Planact feels 
that the current Steering Committee is capacitated sufficiently to continue the 
implementation of the housing project. This withdrawal is to coincide with a major 
change in the finance administration arrangements.  The Gauteng Province appointed 
iXhasa  (a Section 21 Company) as the Account Administrator in this project (and 
indeed in most of the PHP projects in the province). At the time of writing, iXhasa was 
scheduled to take over this function from the Ekurhuleni Metro shortly. 
 
Internal evaluation of the project by Planact 
Planact conducted a mid-term evaluation of the project by interviews of: 
o  50 subsidy beneficiaries 
o  7 house contractors 
o  19 labourers 
o  3 steering committee members 
o  a focus group involving all Steering Committee members 
o  3 Housing Support Centre staff Representative of the province and the municipality. 
 
The interviews are the basis for the findings that follow. 
 
Perceived Benefits of the PHP Approach re labour 
The project team sought to ensure that the building ‘brigades’ would be a vehicle for 
beneficiary participation and not just a construction tool. 
    
  Project beneficiaries and local labour alike were incorporated into job creation and 
skills training opportunities provided by the project.  The participants were satisfied 
with the level of training and felt that the training would enhance their job and 
earning prospects beyond the project cycle.   
 
  Training was conducted on HIV/Aids awareness.  Planact trained 27 Home Based 
Care workers.  As a spin-off, the community started a food garden to improve the 
nutrition and revenue of those living with HIV/Aids and others who help tend the 
garden.  The quality of the training of the Home Based Care workers was such that 
the British High Commission and the East Rand Hospice expressed interest in 
considering for the payment of regular stipends and an expansion of the project.. 
 
  The strategy to incorporate at least 30% women in each brigade raised gender 
awareness in the housing delivery process amongst the community. 
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Perceived difficulties of the PHP approach with respect to labour issues 
The women who were involved in the construction generally felt that great strides had 
been made to include and empower them, but there had been cases of gender 
discrimination or marginalisation: 
 
  There were reported instances where women contractors were sabotaged by their 
labourers who resented working for a woman.   
  Women were seldom heard in open meetings of the steering committee 
  Several men have been open about their apprehension of a woman’s ability to 
perform the roles they had been given.   
  Women labourers were often subjected to poor working conditions, including   
demeaning verbal reprimands, subservient roles within construction brigades, and 
being procured for work less often than their male counterparts.   
  In some cases there were exploitative labour conditions such as 12-hour workdays 
(applying to men and women labourers), which proved highly problematic for 
women labourers who were expected to maintain their commitments to “family 
life” regardless of the demands their employers made. 
 
According to Planact’s assessment “the PHP process is not process whereby micro-
management, is desired, feasible, or cost-effective.  The provision of gender equity has 
become a casualty of this on-going tension within the process; while it is not an 
acceptable fate for the rights-based objective, until a viable monitoring system can be 
put in place, this will continue to be a salient issue” (pg 54, USN, 2003) 
 
Lack of Support for Local Material Suppliers and Emerging Contractors 
The construction process required daily delivery of materials and-or secure storage of 
bulk materials.  Working capital was therefore needed, either on the part of the project, 
or on the part of materials suppliers.  A lack of working capital affected the ability of 
local suppliers and local foundations contractors to be involved.  The procurement of an 
outside materials supplier and foundations contractor was intended to resolve the 
working capital problem.  It is not clear if it did so, as there were reportedly frequent 
failures to deliver materials or complete foundations on time or at the correct quality. 
 
Quality Control and Technical Support   
There was generally a lack of on-site supervision and monitoring.  The necessitated the 
rectification of basic construction deficiencies after the fact.  According to Planact these 
problems “proved not only costly, but time consuming and difficult to track in terms of 
when the problem occurred and who should bear the responsibility of rectifying it” (Pg 
56, USN, 2003).  A lot of these problems were due to insufficient supervision of the ten 
house contractors working at a time in different locations within the project area.   
According to Planact “an entire sub-management process is needed to effectively 
organise, monitor, and sustain support for the construction process” (Pg56, USN, 
2003). 
 
Over half the beneficiaries interviewed complained of problems in the quality of their 
homes.  The poor quality workmanship often occurred as a result of building brigades 
of varying skills levels working under emerging contractors eager to move to the next 
structure.  Planact established that this was exacerbated “by the strained budget which 
did not allow for sufficient intensive training, higher pay rates, or simply ‘user friendly’  
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materials and equipment which [could] compensate for the relative lack of experience 
of the brigades” (pg 56, USN, 2003). 
 
Finance and Administration 
Poor finance and administrative arrangements have also had a negative impact on the 
project, and this also impacted on the labour aspects.  The Council was responsible for 
the financial administration.  There was a significant delay by Council in releasing the 
first working capital ‘float’ to Planact to pay the contractors and labourers.  This 
resulted in Planact using own funds for working capital.  Because of repeated delays in 
release by the council of working capital, the de facto situation was that Planact 
provided the working capital in the first two or more implementation phases of the 
project. 
 
In addition there were delays by the Province in the release of progress payments.  The 
payment delays raised questions at the interface between community and project.   
Planact, as the most visible element of the project-community interface, found its 
credibility being brought into question so seriously by the community that Planact 
believed that the viability of the project as a whole was under threat.  The reasons 
attributed by Planact for the payment delays were the lack of the council’s and 
province’s capacity to process the payments. 
 
Accountability and Transparency 
While the province and council were major stakeholders it was Planact as the secondary 
support organisation that: 
 
o  Served as the main project-community interface 
o  Shouldered the bulk of the responsibility of the day to day management of the 
project.   
 
Another problem was “the council’s preferred material supplier and foundations 
contractor, who was not only the cause of substantial delays but repeatedly produced 
inferior work and would routinely discredit the PHP process by usurping the project 
team and its meetings as a decision making forum, and directly approach members of 
the Steering Committee on a personal level to satisfy his demands” (pg 63, USN, 2003).  
It is Planact opinion that without a more open process, or independent mechanisms for 
procurement, the PHP process can be open to misuse at the expense of beneficiaries. 
 
Summary of employment creation and skills training methods used in Vosloorus 
Figure 10: Summary of employment creation and skills training methods used in Vosloorus 
Assessment 
factor 
Infra-
structure 
Top-structures  Post-completion 
Use of 
technology 
N/A  Appropriate choice of labour 
intensive technologies 
Appropriate choice of 
labour intensive 
technologies for home 
improvements 
Procurement of 
unskilled and 
semi-skilled 
labour 
N/A Sourced  locally  Indications  are  that  local 
people have been 
procured for home 
improvements.  
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Assessment 
factor 
Infra-
structure 
Top-structures  Post-completion 
Procurement of 
artisans, 
supervisors and 
professionals 
N/A   Artisans sourced locally. 
Mentors to emerging 
contractors sourced from 
outside. 
Indications are that the 
more efficient of the 
emerging contractors are 
being engaged by have 
been procured for home 
improvements. 
Materials 
procurement 
N/A   Phase I & II - from outside  
Phase III - local suppliers 
paired with outside suppliers 
Both local and from 
outside  (presumed) 
Equipment 
procurement 
N/A   From outside  Both  local  and  from 
outside  (presumed 
Skills 
development  
N/A   Emerging contractors mentored 
and given repeat contracts to 
manage 
Intensive technical skills 
training of labour 
Basic skills training of home-
owners to enhance their ability 
to supervise 
No information. 
Investments  of 
resources by 
project 
beneficiaries 
N/A Contribution  of  additional 
building materials, according 
household affordability 
No information 
Involvement of 
women 
N/A   Phase I & II - 30% emerging 
contractors and 30 % of 
labourers 
Phase III – 50% emerging 
contractors and 30% of 
labourers 
Instances reported of gender 
discrimination in the workplace 
No information 
Working 
conditions 
N/A   Instances reported of 
exploitative practices  
Home extensions unlikely 
to follow legislated 
guidelines 
 
Skills Development and temporary employment  
Figure 11:  Skills Development and temporary employment  
People with skills* 
People with temporary 
employment**   Activity 
No.  % of resident pop.  No. 
% of resident 
pop. 
LED  20  0.3%  20  0.3% 
Housing  530  8.7%  220  3.6% 
Infrastructure  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
Social Facilities  27  0.4%  27  0.4% 
Total  577  9.5%  267  4.4% 
* People with skills refers to those trained in the Vosloorus projects 
** People with temporary employment refers to the temporary jobs yielded in the project 
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Estimated Resource Outflows on Phase 1 
Figure 12:  Estimated Resource Outflows on Phase 1 
Paid to local 
providers 
homeowners) 
Paid to outside 
providers of goods & 
services 
  TOTAL 
SPENT 
Value  % of 
Total 
spent 
Value  % of 
Total 
spent 
Training 
Training provider 
Training coordination 
1 136 000
1 100 000
36 000
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
1 136 000 
1 100 000 
36 000  
House construction 
Foundations labour & 
materials 
Building materials (excl 
foundations) 
Labour (excl foundations) 
Project management & site 
office costs 
Fees to municipality 
2 267 500
825 000
678 750
572 000
142 500
7 500
698 500
36 000
NIL
572 500
90 000
NIL
31%4%
NIL100%
63%
NIL
1 569 000 
789 000 
 
678 750 
 
NIL 
52 500 
 
7 500 
69%96%
100%
NIL37%
100%
Total  3 403 500 698 500 21% 2 705 000  79%
[Source of Rand values – Planact.  Presentation of figures and % value by report authors] 
 
About 30% of the construction costs were paid to local providers of goods & services, 
mainly for local labour.  Figures for Phases II and III were not available.  Based on the 
information that was available, it appears that the spending pattern in Phase II was 
substantially similar.  In Phase III, as previously described, the opportunity was 
exploited to redirect spending on materials in favour of local materials suppliers. This 
resulted in about another 30% of the total value of that phase being spent locally.  This 
increased the total proportion of payments made to local suppliers of services and 
goods to about 60%.  The remaining potential to redirect spending in favour of the local 
lies in the foundations. An obstacle to redirect spending on this item was that due to 
adverse soil conditions, the foundations required extra care in their design and 
construction.  This appeared to preclude local contractors from being regarded by the 
project team as being eligible to do the work.  Given the quality problems and delays 
experienced with outside contractors on the foundations, it may have been viable to 
spend some of the substantial training budget to develop the more specialised local 
construction skills, and to boost the local spending to the 90% range. 
 
The training budget for Phase I represents about a third of the total budget.  True, some 
of the training results were not vocational training, but were rather life skills training (in 
particular the education of prospective home-owners in house design and contractor 
supervision).  Nevertheless, the training budget, in conventional terms, seems rather 
high in relation to the capital budget for Phase I, and in particular in relation to the 
amounts paid to local goods & service providers during construction. 
 
Commentary on employment aspects in Vosloorus 
As in the case of Cato Manor, the Vosloorus project, despite some shortcomings, 
impacted positively on employment aspects. 
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  Labour-based construction was viewed as essential from the start of the project.  In 
quantifiable terms, this resulted in 30% or more of capital costs being paid to local 
labour. 
 
  The policy commitment to buy materials locally, though not immediately 
implementable, was carried through.  This led in Phase III to 30% or more of capital 
costs being paid to local suppliers, and to the creation of business linkages between 
emerging and established private sector. 
 
The holistic-development approach, followed even with this comparatively small-scale 
project, led to skills development and economic activities in several fields, namely 
construction, project management, citizenship, primary health care, and urban or 
suburban agriculture. 
 
4.3. SOME FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE STUDIES 
The following section briefly discusses the case studies in relation to one another.  Key 
points of comparison around core themes in the report are presented in summary form 
in the table which follows.  
 
Figure 13: Summary of points of comparison 
Issue  Cato Manor  Vosloorus 
Beneficiary participation  Moderate  High 
Local labour sourcing  High – but some  resistance 
to women 
High – but short-lived 
resistance to women 
Skills High  High 
Links to LED  High  Low in the past, but there are 
indications that an LED 
program is slowly evolving 
Sourcing of materials  Non-local  Non-local 
Construction approach  Appropriate technology & 
contractor support system 
used 
Appropriate technology & 
contractor support system used 
 
Despite their very different scale and contexts, the cases have a number of striking 
similarities.  These include: 
  Some attempts, more explicit in the Cato Manor case, to adopt a holistic vision of 
community development. Improvements in the built, economic, social and 
institutional environments were regarded and managed as integral to slum 
upgrading and greenfields housing processes but in practise this was not always 
sustained; 
  The use of an emerging contractor development program (as opposed to a simpler 
labour-only basis), and the longer-term benefits of this approach; 
  The critical roles performed by the development agencies in guiding and sustaining 
the developments; 
  Relatively well-capacitated municipalities supporting the projects. 
 
A holistic approach 
In South Africa the conventional definition of slum upgrading is the transfer of secure 
tenure, provision of water supply, roads and sewerage, and the construction of houses.  
The project is complete when the last house is handed over.  However, both cases  
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studies define slum upgrading in much broader community development terms, in 
which housing, service and tenure delivery are important components, as are other 
aspects of spatial, economic and social development, and the creation of viable local 
development institutions.  In other words, the handover of the last house represents an 
important milestone, but not the end, of the project. 
 
In the Cato Manor case, housing projects are conceived as important, but not the 
overwhelmingly dominant, element within a larger holistic urban development 
program.  The variety and scale of elements within the Cato Manor development 
program – infrastructure, housing, social facilities, LED and social development – 
made it possible for unemployment relief, improved employability and livelihood 
creation opportunities to be linked across project-specific, spatial and sectorally 
boundaries.  The establishment of a local development institution in the form of the 
Area Based Management entity is noteworthy in many respects, not least of which is 
that it is likely to enhance the prospects of the continuation of employment-intensive 
project methodologies, the continuation of entrepreneur support programs and the 
continued skills development of work-seekers. 
 
In the Vosloorus case, the housing project is conceived as the starting increment from 
which other development programs follow (notably LED and social development).  The 
Vosloorus case has not let the initial absence of  a holistic and coherent development 
program prevent such a program from being incrementally articulated and pursued 
within the confines of a smaller and less well-located geographic locale than the Cato 
Manor case.  The evolution of the housing support centre into a more broadly-focused 
development institution is significant, for similar reasons as was the case in the Cato 
Manor Development Programme. 
 
In both case studies, a long-term agenda has been viewed as necessary in order to give a 
reasonable chance for the holistic development approach to succeed.  The long-term 
agenda also implies that new and unforeseen development opportunities which arise are 
more likely to be made use of.  However, both the cases struggled to sustain this 
approach and in many cases implementation not reflect the intentions – in part because 
other stakeholders did not necessarily buy-in to this approach and tended to stick to 
existing formulas. 
 
Contractor support 
It is also significant that both cases make use of an emerging contractor support 
program as the means by which to develop longer-term employment prospects as well 
as the vehicle through which to utilise local skilled and unskilled labour.  This approach 
appears to proceed from the beliefs that: 
 
  Labour-only approaches lack long-term sustainability (though they have a high 
impact in the short-term construction phase) 
  The establishment of contractors is an effective and appropriate interface for 
labourers in the project 
  After the handover of the last house, contractors are more likely to be in a position 
to attract and implement new building projects, and thereby have better prospects 
for the establishment of livelihoods  
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  The pure self-build approach (used for example in a sizable proportion of PHP 
projects) does not provide much of an entry point for the owner-builder into the 
broader construction sector 
  It is unusual for labour-based project-specific unemployment relief to be translated 
into more sustained [self-]employment within the original project area 
  Employment-intensive construction (whether labour-based on emerging contractor 
based) cannot be done without additional support funding and appropriately skilled 
staff. 
 
Critical roles performed by the development agencies 
CMDA in the one case, and Planact in partnership with the Ekurhuleni Metro in the 
other case, performed catalytic roles in: 
  Conceiving the housing delivery projects as elements within a holistic and long-
term project 
  Investing heavily in their respective technical skills development and contractor 
support programs 
  Mobilising political and financial capital from a variety of sources 
  Shouldering significant development risk in an environment where few others were 
prepared to do so 
  Committing themselves to long-term involvement and consultation with their target 
communities.   
 
Also critical to the success of the holistic and long-term development agenda is the 
agencies’ mission / vision, the adequacy of the agencies’ human resources to translate 
the vision/mission into the project design and implementation phases, and the agencies’ 
ability to mobilise additional support funding and skills resources in excess of what was 
available through the housing subsidy scheme.  The development agencies in both cases 
required additional funds to cover the costs of skills development and contractor 
support, and the increased overhead that arises from a holistic and consultative 
approach. 
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5.   Recommendations – Opportunities for employment 
creation 
The recommendations, as discussed below, arise from the South African policy 
environment, the two case studies, the experience of the authors, and debates amongst 
urban development practitioners, analysts and activists in South Africa and beyond.  
Many of the themes raised here are not particularly new, but the authors believe they 
deserve renewed attention.  In particular, work by the national EPWP office has been of 
use as have articles by McCutcheon (2001), Fitchett (2001), Croswell and McCutcheon 
(2001) who have look at the issues under consideration in previous research processes. 
 
The topic under consideration encompasses both policy and micro levels, and the types 
of decision-makers are numerous.  Consequently, the recommendations vary from those 
applicable to national policy makers right through to opportunities that local project 
stakeholders could examine.  The graphic below (Figure 14) seeks to list many of the 
factors which might, in one way or the other, impact on employment creation in 
housing and related processes. The graphic is followed by a table (Figure 16) of 
suggestions that could yield positive impact if handled in the correct manner.  Many of 
the suggestions form part of a package of suggestions, and therefore care needs to be 
taken in considering the viability of any individual suggestion.  It should also be noted 
that individual suggestions imply trade-offs that need to be considered.  
 
There is some recent evidence that employment levels in South Africa are beginning to 
improve as growth rates improve.  However, the scale of the employment challenge is 
still so large that it needs to be a leading national priority.  If employment were to 
become such a leading priority, then actions cannot be limited to narrow fields of 
activity.  For example, increasing the level of training of project beneficiaries and local 
labour requires project-level actions, institutional adjustments in the municipality and 
province in which a project is located, and in policy and regulatory adjustments 
nationally.  This is by no means to say the incremental adjustments do not have a place.  
In fact, the experience in the case studies does show that there is scope to yield some 
meaningful project-level impacts.  However, without conscious effort by decision-
makers to mainstream the cases, the approaches and results of the case studies are likely 
to remain isolated cases.  The graphic which follows presents some of the key factors 
which relate to one another in a systemic sense and which would potentially need some 
attention. 
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Figure 14: Factors affecting employment in sum upgrading/housing projects 
Some key factors affecting employment in slum upgrading/housing projects
Beneficiary 
skills and 
participation
PROJECT 
INTERFACE
Project 
management
Governance 
of project
Contractor and materials 
supplier mandates / 
capacity
LOCAL 
ENVIRONMENT Local 
authority 
policy
Local 
authority 
delivery 
capacity 
(infrastructure 
and 
administrative 
processes)
Civil 
society 
capabilities
Capabilities of 
support 
institutions / 
organisations
Competitiveness / 
quality of goods and 
services providers
Local business 
& labour market 
environment
NATIONAL 
CONTEXT
State of national 
economy
Policy 
signals in 
documents 
and by 
leaders
Regulations
Leadership 
prioritisation
Technical 
aspects of 
policy
Process 
management
Mobilisation and 
participation of 
stakeholders
Approaches 
to private 
and public 
financing
 
 
Beyond attention to these factors, it is also suggested that stakeholders reach consensus 
on: what constitutes employment, and; what should be done to maximise employment 
in large-scale housing and informal settlement upgrades.  There was little consensus 
amongst those interviewed for the case studies of what constituted employment in the 
context of their projects and in general this could range form informal employment for 
a day to a longer term formal contract.   
 
Internationally and domestically there are a range of definitions of and approaches to 
employment.  In the case studies and in the EPWP there appear to be a considerable 
focus on temporary employment - ranging from informal day jobbing to committed 
employment contracts for the duration of a project.  The authors urge that temporary 
employment ought to be a standard outcome of every housing project.  However, 
without considerable resources and attention beyond the life of the initial housing 
project, the creation of temporary employment seems to rarely translate into sustained 
jobs. 
 
The EPWP has sought to address this through learnerships that start during the project.  
The inadequacy of some training and the relatively short cycles of employment have 
tended to curtail some of the impacts that might have originally been envisaged in the 
initiative.  In the housing sector, practice appears to be some way behind that of the 
EPWP.  Temporary employment in housing would benefit by the finalisation of the 
draft protocols currently under discussion between EPWP and the National Department 
of Housing.   
 
An approach which places housing as one step in a process to create holistic urban 
settlement would create greater potential for employment.  If such an approach is taken,  
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then the number of projects that are needed to help create a holistic built environment 
are numerous – construction projects in infrastructure, public facilities, housing – and 
post-construction the operation, maintenance and upgrade of the public (and private) 
building stock. The collective duration of these construction and post-construction 
projects will run into many years.  If an approach can be taken to treat each individual 
project as a component within a larger local development program, then much better 
employment results are likely to be obtained than the prevailing piecemeal approach.  
This point links closely with a widespread criticism that the Department of Housing’s 
approach has not encouraged integration with more general urban development 
activities.  Rust (2003) makes the point based on a survey of key role players in the 
housing field that, 
“… rather than seeing the housing subsidy as a catalyst for housing development, 
the department has conflated the subsidy with development itself.”  
[Rust, 2003: p19] 
 
The graphic below presents a conceptual “phasing” of an urban development process in 
which shelter-related activities are not delivered in isolation from a range of other 
processes that might have the potential to yield more sustainable outcomes in 
employment terms and in other aspects. 
 
Figure 15: Holistic urban development environment 
Placing employment interventions in a context of holistic 
urban development processes (conceptual)
Bulk
infrastructure
Shelter upgrade
and/or housing 
delivery
Community/social
facilities and
service provision
Community 
development
planning
Reinforce social capital and build institutional capabilities
Private investment 
in home or business
Plan for and 
facilitate 
employment-
related 
activities prior 
to and beyond 
housing 
focused phase
Urban management
and maintenance
 
 
Recommendations emerging from the policy experience, the case studies and other 
secondary sources are summarised in the table below.  It should be noted that not all of 
these are universally applicable and in some cases they are already matters on the 
agenda of policy makers or urban development practitioners.  However, they do 
present, in totality, a comprehensive set of actionable measures which stakeholders,  
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whatever their point of interaction with informal upgrades and housing processes, 
might gain something from. 
 
Figure 16: Recommended interventions 
Area for 
attention 
and 
Rationale 
 
Key area(s) of focus 
 
Possible 
actors 
 
Housing 
regulations  
The manner in 
which regulations 
are drafted, 
interpreted and 
implemented 
affects what can 
be achieved. 
(i) Annual escalations – Introduce annual escalation of the 
subsidy amount for the unspent portion of subsidies of projects 
for which subsidies had been approved in prior years.  This will 
ensure real budget reductions arising from delays do not cut in to 
employment impacts. 
(ii) Subsidy types - Given the long project duration of a 
greenfields or in situ upgrade project, replace project-linked 
subsidies with a land & tenure subsidy, a planning & 
infrastructure subsidy, and a Consolidation (i.e. house 
construction) subsidy.  By allowing for a “layering” of subsidies 
specific conditions can be imposed during very different phases 
of the housing and upgrade work to maximise employment and 
the present scenario of issues such as land acquisitions leaving 
little left in the subsidy pot for top structures becoming less of an 
obstacle.  
 (iii) Subsidy sub-budgets - Review the current allocations of the 
subsidy amount to different project components with the intention 
of allocating a greater proportion for top-structure (i.e. the 
housing unit) and therefore allowing for related employment 
linkage work in terms of materials acquisition for top-structures 
and labour intensive models of construction (This should not 
involve reductions in other built environment spending, but 
should avoid the bulk of the subsidy amount being used to cover 
non top structure costs such as service reticulation). 
(iv) Avoid increasing project-linked costs without making a 
subsidy adjustment.  For example requiring greater occupational 
health and safety compliance in projects should be accompanied 
by a subsidy adjustment. 
(v) Milestone payments – Rework the release of funds approach 
so as to promote  improved project cash flow in order to improve 
conditions which would encourage the participation of SMEs, 
established private sector and NGOs alike, and to align the 
subsidy payment system with the payments systems of other 
departments and the private sector..  In particular consider 
making monthly progress payments against certification.  The 
present milestone payment places major cash flow obligations 
on projects which detract from SME empowerment opportunities. 
 
National 
Department of 
Housing, 
Provincial 
Departments 
of Housing and 
Local 
Authorities 
Management of 
housing 
projects 
The manner in 
which housing 
projects are 
managed can 
foster greater 
levels of skills 
training and 
community 
mobilisation 
(i) De-emphasis on fast-tracking – The present excessive focus 
on fast-tracking housing-related projects tends to preclude or 
diminish community mobilisation, training, and linkage of the 
housing project to other projects that benefit the same 
community. 
(ii) Project down-time – Encourage better use of project down-
time (e.g. while awaiting planning & engineering approvals and 
payment releases) for training and community mobilisation and 
community awareness. 
(iii) Project phases - Expand the recognised phases of housing 
project.  The recognition  that a housing project has pre-project, 
project preparation, implementation, maintenance, and 
improvement  phases could encourage greater mobilisation of 
project capital and operating funds and increases the prospects 
for temporary and sustained employment 
 
National 
Department of 
Housing, 
Department of 
Provincial and 
Local 
Government, 
municipalities  
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Area for 
attention 
and 
Rationale 
 
Key area(s) of focus 
 
Possible 
actors 
 
Housing policy  
Policy 
frameworks send 
signals to those 
making delivery 
decisions. 
(i) PHP - Set firm targets for scaling up PHP delivery. 
(ii) Further encourage a more integrated settlement product for 
greenfields and upgrade projects so as to sustain employment 
creation opportunities and to help generate local economic 
activity.   
(iii) The “units are everything” approach, which places emphasis 
on yielding the highest possible number of units in available 
space, has been absorbed at all levels resulting in products with 
a diminished sustainability potential.  This is most often seen at 
local level where the maximisation of units often occurs at the 
expense of making urban land available for other needs such as 
recreation, economic development and social services.  Policy 
signalling must be carefully considered in this regard. 
 
National 
Department of 
Housing, 
Department of 
Provincial and 
Local 
Government, 
SA Cities 
Network/SALG
A 
Matching funds  
By developing an 
integrated 
package of funds 
model, scope 
exists to leverage 
government 
resources in a 
combined 
manner to 
achieve targets 
(i) The Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) has been used 
effectively by some municipalities to create public works 
opportunities.  Better alignment of MIG and the housing subsidy 
scheme could include setting targets for employment creation in 
every housing project.   
(ii) Where municipalities’ access to MIG funds is limited, some 
support funds should be availed for the design of the project so 
that it optimises employment opportunities. 
(iii) Establish an urban land fund to cover land acquisition costs, 
and to maximise the housing subsidy portion available for house 
construction. 
(iv) For each housing subsidy awarded, allocate matching funds 
for skills and home-owner training. 
 
National 
Department of 
Land Affairs, 
National 
Department of 
Provincial and 
Local 
Government, 
National 
Treasury, 
Department of 
Water Affairs 
and Forestry, 
Local 
authorities, 
Dept Labour, 
Construction 
Sills & 
Education 
Authority 
 
Housing 
implementation  
Numerous 
decisions are 
taken at the local 
level which 
impact on the 
nature of the 
housing delivery 
process itself and 
its alignment with 
other municipal 
activities (e.g. 
LED, parks and 
recreation etc).  
active 
management of 
these delivery 
interfaces could 
allow for further 
employment 
opportunities to 
be identified and 
acted on. 
 
(i)  Place greater emphasis on the design of upgrade and 
greenfield projects.  At present most design work in terms of 
settlement layout, public facilities and the design of housing units 
follows a very limited format.  The lack of innovation and design 
for employment intensity in the construction/development phase 
and for the post-construction phase limits employment 
opportunities. 
(ii) Municipalities are already, and will increasingly be at the 
centre of the housing delivery process.  Some will be able to 
draw on existing public works units to ensure all aspects of the 
housing delivery process enable employment creation, whilst 
others might need to consider setting up a unit or employing a 
suitably qualified person to assist in maximising various 
opportunities. 
(iii) Time frames of housing projects should allow for greater 
community participation, skills development in the project 
preparation phase (i.e. in advance of going on site). 
(iv) Design into the project the longer-term operation and 
maintenance of public infrastructure and public buildings, 
processes which in turn can be used to generate employment. 
(v) Build the capacity of provincial and municipal officials, 
contractors, and support organisations so that they have greater 
awareness of the need for and techniques of improving 
employment. 
 
Provincial and 
Local 
authorities, 
contractors, 
support 
organisations 
Technology,  Encourage the use of labour-intensive methods in all aspects of  Contracting  
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Area for 
attention 
and 
Rationale 
 
Key area(s) of focus 
 
Possible 
actors 
 
equipment and 
tools  
The technology 
used in the 
construction 
process can 
have substantial 
ramifications on 
labour usage. 
 
the development (including e.g. bush clearance, survey, road 
and house platforms, trenching).  Specifying appropriate 
technology in terms of processes and materials is essential in 
this regard. 
authority (e.g. 
Municipality) 
Labour  
Sourcing of local 
labour can 
improve project 
buy-in by 
beneficiaries and 
allow for a 
“sweat-equity” 
contribution. 
 
The use of local labour in upgrade and in many greenfields 
projects is widespread.  However, lessons could be learnt from 
the Cato Manor process whereby a Job Opportunities Bureau 
attempted to link local labour to employment beyond initial 
contracts on housing-related projects. 
Municipality, 
Department of 
Labour 
Materials  
The cost of 
materials makes 
up a large 
proportion of the 
total cost of 
construction.  
The production 
and distribution 
of materials can 
generate 
significant longer 
term employment 
opportunities. 
 
Block making, casting lintels, door and window frames and other 
inputs into the construction process can all yield employment 
opportunities.  However, small local suppliers tend to struggle to 
supply at volume and within very tight cost parameters.  Linking 
mainstream suppliers with local suppliers can assist as can 
encouraging large producers of building materials to seek local 
partners. 
 
Private sector, 
Municipality 
Local 
contractors  
Building the 
capabilities and 
survival potential 
of local 
contractors the 
scope exists to 
assist in 
generating longer 
term employment 
opportunities. 
(i) Both case studies show the benefits of using the project 
process as a business development exercise for local 
contractors who will, more often than not, source local labour as 
they expand their business horizons.  The model used by the 
African Renaissance Rural Road Upgrading Project could be 
useful here (KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport). 
(ii) The design and implementation plan of the infrastructure 
phase should make provision for the parceling of the 
infrastructure project into sub-projects.  Examples of methods to 
create sub-projects include the parceling of the project area into 
smaller geographic units (e.g. with the street as the basic 
geographic unit) or into smaller activity sets (e.g. water & 
sanitation as one unit and roads & stormwater as another), or 
into combinations of these. 
(iii) The design and the later implementation plan of the house 
construction phase should make provision for the parceling of 
the infrastructure project into sub-projects.  Examples of 
methods to create sub-projects include the parceling of the 
project area into smaller geographic units (e.g. with the cluster of 
five to ten houses on one side of a street as the basic 
geographic unit) or into smaller activity sets (e.g. setting out and 
foundations as one unit, wall and windows as another, roof as 
yet another, plumbing as another unit, and finishes as a further 
unit), or into combinations of these. 
(iv) Eligibility criteria for candidate infrastructure or house 
contractors should include local residency, turnover (if an SME), 
Municipality, 
project support 
institutions, 
private 
contractors  
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Area for 
attention 
and 
Rationale 
 
Key area(s) of focus 
 
Possible 
actors 
 
historic disadvantage, and gender – i.e. similar criteria as 
required under procurement law. 
Involvement of 
CBOs  
In being more 
informed by local 
needs it is likely 
that in an 
environment of 
poverty and 
unemployment 
local 
stakeholders will 
seek project 
outputs linked to 
employment. 
 
Although both case studies placed considerable emphasis on the 
involvement of local stakeholders, participation more generally is 
patchy at best.  This is likely to undermine the degree to which 
the project is oriented to meet local needs. 
 
Civil society, 
Municipality, 
local support 
institutions. 
Involvement of 
women  
Studies have 
shown that many 
beneficiary 
households are 
effectively 
headed by 
women.  As a 
key part of the 
beneficiary 
community they 
are equally 
entitled to 
opportunities 
around 
employment. 
 
The Vosloorus case study provided some insight into how 
effective targeted support to women entrepreneurs could be.  
The PHP project also specified targets for women in a number of 
key posts. 
Civil society, 
Municipality 
Skills 
development  
Through 
enhancing skills 
the sustainability 
of employment 
opportunities is 
improved. 
 
Models being worked through with the EPWP programme and 
the Construction Skills Authority need further attention and could 
gain from being more closely integrated with local institutions 
and programmes to link people access short term employment to 
other employment opportunities within the urban development 
field.  For example, assisting people with work experience in the 
building trade to diversify skills to other fields could substantially 
assist local labour trained up for a specific project to seek 
employment in government service provision programmes post 
upgrades or the launch of housing projects. 
 
Dept of 
Labour, EPWP 
office, 
Municipalities, 
Construction 
SETA 
Working 
conditions 
Inadequate 
working 
conditions are 
likely to 
undermine the 
development 
gains from 
increasing 
employment. 
 
Increasing levels of attention need to be played to occupational 
health and safety, rates pay, procedural matters and the like to 
avoid exploitation and contribute to improved labour conditions 
more generally.  Setting local labour charters for projects and 
having a functioning labour committee connected to projects 
could enhance practice. 
 
Municipalities, 
contractors, 
beneficiaries, 
Department of 
Labour 
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6.  Conclusion 
Through a description of relevant policies and of two case studies, this report made a 
partial examination of South African approaches to employment in housing projects.  
The reflections and recommendations that emerged from the project range from broad-
level proposals to a limited number of specific proposals.   
 
The report found that there is considerable potential to improve employment creation in 
housing projects in South Africa.  This is in line with findings in other studies on urban 
development such as those reported on by McCutcheon (2001) and Fitchett (2001).  
However, the potential has not been exploited due to the constraints found in policies, 
regulations, administrative processes, management, governance, and human capacity.  
There are few explicit policy signals linking direct employment generation with 
housing.  Employment-generation is explicitly encouraged through other government 
departments, but these do not extend to housing policy.  Considerable effort would be 
needed to make employment generation a key objective of housing and related 
development.  The UNDP has articulated the need for such an effort to be given priority 
in South Africa makes the case that, 
“Measures to ensure that growth actively generates employment, while integrating the 
poor into the process, require government intervention of one sort or another. They also 
necessarily imply ‘interference’ with the market, even if only for a particular duration. 
Such proactive measures require consideration of general policies to ensure that an 
employment generating and labour absorbing growth path is initiated and maintained. 
They also demand specific employment policies to overcome problems associated with 
the low employment intensity of growth and the weak integrability of the unemployed, 
especially the poor, in the growth path.” 
[UNDP, 2004: p11] 
 
If employment-creation was to become a key objective within settlement-related 
activity, then it will probably achieve the best results if urban development minimises 
the fragmented and narrowly framed interventions which have characterized human 
settlement programmes in South Africa to date, and maximises on sustainable and 
holistic urban development models that are rooted in community empowerment.  This 
point is reinforced in Rust’s (2003) review of progress in housing policy where it is 
stated that considerable attention is needed in relation to, 
“… pre-subsidy issues such as land and property markets, and post-subsidy issues such 
as home improvements and community-building.” (Rust, 2003: p22) 
This holistic approach requires far greater alignment of policies, the improvement of 
regulations, and much closer cooperation between government and non-government 
entities.  There is already some movement in this direction, but a concerted effort is 
required to reinforce this movement into on-the-ground initiatives and in particular to 
empower local authorities to work with local stakeholders in achieving greater 
employments impacts in what will remain for some time to come a major focus area of 
government expenditure. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Cato Manor Housing Units Delivered 
Housing as at March 2002  
Site completions  4 576  
Housing completions  4 051  
Cumulative shack relocations  1 110  
Summary of Housing Projects 
  Completed units @ 
Sept ‘02 
Completed by 
March ‘03 
To be 
completed ‘03-‘04 
Informal settlement Upgrading projects  
Wiggins Umkhumbane  672  10   
Old Dunbar    245  655 
New Dunbar    245  355 
Cato Crest Settled Area    50  1 350 
Jamaica  180  320   
Nsimbini Ph 1  420  10   
Greenfields Incremental projects 
Chesterville Incremental Ph 1  129     
Chesterville Incremental Ph 2  10  50  143 
Cato Crest Greenfields North  332  20   
Wiggins Fast Track (E & W)  1,040     
N & S of Booth Road  400  16   
Wiggins Infill    200  1 036 
Umkhumbaan Freeway Slopes    200  1 036 
Technical College Interface     200  1 036 
Hospital Site    200  1 036 
Central Housing    50  289 
Nsimbini Ph 2    40  80 
Credit Linked housing 
Chesterville Bond Ph 1-4  751  20  108 
Umkhumbaan Infil  15  20  120 
Grosvenor Road      250 
Cato Crest Interface      100 
Social housing 
Shayamoya Ph 1  320     
Shayamoya Infil      240 
Social Housing Ikhaya      252 
Umkhumbaan High Density      150 
Roosfontein (Social Housing)      600 
Part Hillary      500 
Part Bellair      500 
Aids Housing    2   
 